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Abstract
The lean concepts of right thing, right place, and at the right time can be applied
to current and future launch systems. While much has been written on the concept of
lean manufacturing and production, this thesis is the first in a series of studies from the
Air Force Institute of Technology and Massachusetts Institute of Technology to
investigate lean space launch operations. Nevertheless, many of the principles of lean
thinking that have been applied to manufacturing and production are relevant to space
operation enterprises including launch operations. The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI)
and the concepts of lean thinking are discussed in this thesis. A review of launch system
requirements and opportunities for lean practices is also presented. This is followed by
an analysis of current expendable launch procedures to identify truly lean, value-added
steps in launch operations. The thesis also presents a case study highlighting current
Delta II expendable launch processing operations. Results of the study show how lean
principles have helped the Delta launch team drastically reduce on-pad time, restructure
its testing philosophy, and streamline overall operations flow. Many of these practices
can be applied to other expendable launch operations and provide a strong systems
baseline for the next generation of vehicles such as the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV).

XI

SPACE LAUNCH OPERATIONS
AND THE
LEAN AEROSPACE INITIATIVE

1

Introduction

For over thirty years the United States has led the world in space use and space
exploration. Expendable launch vehicles have opened up space access and are deploying
systems that change the way mankind communicates, lives, and functions. Military and
commercial opportunities in space are limitless, but currently come at a very high price
and with low mission flexibility. For the United States to compete strongly in a global
commercial market and strengthen its military aerospace force, many of its launch
operators are challenging existing launch processes and infrastructures. They recognize
that the future of space operations depends on systems that are developed, processed, and
launched through more reliable, responsive, and cost-effective means.
The lean concepts of right thing, right place, and at the right time can be applied
to current and future launch systems. While operating in a shrinking defense budget, the
U.S. Air Force still expects launch vehicles to provide assured access to space through
predictable, responsive, and reliable means. In an increasingly uncertain geo-political
environment the Air Force is counting on launch vehicles to provide cost-effective means
of maintaining and improving space readiness, access, and mission responsiveness. The
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following list highlights Air Force spacelift mission need requirements for next century's
launch systems [3:4]:
a) Deploy a broad range of spacecraft to intended mission orbits.
b) Provide spacelift designs and operations processes that are supportable,
maintainable, and able to meet schedule demands.
c) Successfully meet spacecraft mission assurance requirements while delivering a
spacecraft payload to orbit without failure.
d) Operate at significantly lower per mission and life cycle costs than current launch
systems.
e) Provide the ability to quickly respond to changing space missions and incorporate
these abilities into baseline spacelift designs and concepts of operations.
Specifically, Air Force objectives for the next-generation of expendable launch
vehicles include [4:23]:
•

Life-cycle and annual fixed costs that are 50% less than current ELVs

•

30 to 60 day response call-ups per launch site (depending on class of launch
vehicle)

•

The ability to launch 26 missions per year from the United States

Efficient launch operations are imperative to achieve national spacelift goals. In
order to take full advantage of new launch vehicle benefits, launch operators must assess
their current operations and build efficient, lean operations that can provide savings today
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and in the future with the new generation of launch vehicles. Many key players in
today's launch business are members of the Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) consortium
and are initiating steps to practice system-level approaches leading to leaner launch
vehicle manufacturing and operations.

As a result, launch providers offer more

competitive launch services to government and commercial customers. Appendix A lists
LAI consortium members as of January 1999.

1.1 Purpose of Thesis
Unlike much of the current "lean" research concentrating on manufacturing and
production techniques, this thesis is a first in a series of studies from the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to
focus on lean space operations. The concepts, case studies, and results of this thesis will
ultimately aid in the population of the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) maintained at MIT.
This research can be integrated into tools and practices that help space launch
organizations become leaner.
The primary goal of this research is to identify truly lean, value-added steps in
current launch operations. This is accomplished by first introducing the reader to the
Lean Aerospace Initiative, the underlying program designed to improve manufacturing
and operations processes. Current launch operation requirements and mission needs are
outlined in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 breaks down the launch process into its enterprise
activities.

A launch operations case study and analyses conclude Chapter 3, while

Chapter 4 outlines future launch programs.
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2

Literature Review

While much has been written on the concept of lean manufacturing and
production, this study is the first within the Lean Aerospace Initiative to investigate space
launch operations.

However, many of the principles of lean thinking used in

manufacturing and production can be applied to launch operations. The concepts of lean
thinking and the Lean Aerospace Initiative are reviewed in the following sections and are
followed by published launch system requirements.

2.1 The Concept of the Lean Enterprise
Creating a lean enterprise means removing all wasteful activities, unnecessary
time, and error sources from a process.

While such a "process Utopia" may prove

unrealistic, it should nevertheless be an organization's clearly defined goal. In fact,
achieving perfection is the ultimate goal in any lean process. Figure 1 depicts the basic
principles of lean thinking and portrays how customer value, the value stream, and
perfection are related.

2.1.1

Value
Value can only be defined by the ultimate customer and is created by the system

producer. Defining value makes for some interesting debates among systems engineers,
but it is an important concept in any producer-customer relationship. Since the customer
defines value, it is the customer's value system that should drive the problem solving
process.
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Developers
• Identify customer Values
• Line up value-creating
process
• Strive for
Perfection

Value Stream
• Ensures continuous flow
• Always flows in customer
direction
• Continuously optimized for
full efficiency

Figure 1

Customer
• Specifies value
• "Pulls" value stream
• Ensures constant system
focus

Elements of Lean Thinking

In his book, Patterns of Problem Solving [37], Moshe Rubinstein states a value
system constitutes a framework that influences reality. He contends that a value system
is "based on an appreciation of what is worth striving for and the choice of actions to
bridge the gap between what is a perceived present state and the desired or preferred goal
state" [37:474]. In today's marketplace, it is the customer's product value system that
not only defines what is worth striving for, but what is ultimately worth paying for.
There has traditionally existed a dichotomy of value definition between producers
and customers. The concept of value is rather subjective and may be akin to beauty as it
is also determined by the "eyes of the beholder." For example, highly skilled experts
may feel that they are adding value to a product by adding more high-tech features when
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the customer may be looking for a system that does its job in the simplest way. Even the
concept of simplicity is dependent on the person operating the system. Nevertheless, the
concepts of lean thinking force the producer to focus on the ultimate customer's value
when optimizing enterprise flow.

2.1.2

The Value Stream
Womack and Jones [48:19] define the value stream as "the set of all the specific

actions required to bring a specific product (whether a good, a service, or increasingly, a
combination of the two) through three critical management tasks of any business: the
problem-solving task, the information management task, and the physical transformation
task."
When the customer's value is defined, a value stream can be identified. Only
upon identifying a value stream can non-value added and wasteful steps in the process be
isolated and removed. The remaining activities in the lean system, or enterprise, should
then be made to "flow" in the customer direction.

The principles of flow management

are to concentrate on managing the value stream for a specific service or product,
eliminate wasteful organizational barriers by creating a lean enterprise, and continuously
apply value-added techniques so that value can flow continuously [48:52-66]. If the
value stream is properly focused on the customer's values and needs, the customer will
"pull" the product from the producer as needed. Otherwise, the producer ends up pushing
products, often unwanted, onto the customer.
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2.1.3 Perfection
Process perfection begins to occur when systems are designed around customer
values. Perfect processes encompass value streams that flow continuously and let the
customers pull value from the enterprise [48:25]. Getting value to flow more directly to
the customer exposes hidden flaws in the system. The harder the customer pulls, the
more the impediments to flow are revealed and can be removed. Eventually, a better
system will evolve through the continual application of lean principles.
Increased demand for space launch services are exposing impediments in the flow
of launch operations.

These demands and new requirements challenge the existing

launch infrastructure and systems. As mentioned previously, today's launch customer
places a high value on cost effectiveness and responsiveness. Whether launch customers
know it or not, they are looking for an improved launch value stream that is leaner than
today's current launch practices.

2.2 The Lean Aerospace Initiative
The Lean Aerospace Initiative originates from the International Motor Vehicle
Program (MVP). The IMVP was conducted by a team from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology as described in The Machine that Changed the World [47].

This

groundbreaking study helped coin the phrase "lean production." In the five milliondollar, five-year study, the authors compared the Japanese auto industry to companies
that practice traditional mass production techniques first developed by Henry Ford and
specialized "craft production" companies such as Europe's Rolls Royce, Mercedes, and

2-4

Jaguar. The study highlights concepts first created by Eiji Toyoda and Taichi Ohno for
the fledging Toyota Motor Company in the 1950's. The lean production techniques they
pioneered a half-century ago have turned many of the Japanese auto companies into
industries synonymous with quality. With the published MVP study as a catalyst, much
of the U.S. auto industry has re-engineered its fundamental management, design, and
production processes. In fact, many auto manufacturers across the globe are embracing
lean production as a necessity to retain a viable market share in the global marketplace.
Since The Machine that Changed the World was published, many aerospace corporations
have also recognized the necessity for lean production in today's competitive, but
shrinking, defense market. To lower costs, shorten cycle time, and improve quality, these
companies are implementing the following lean concepts:
•

Re-engineering organizations and key processes starting with Integrated
Product and Process Development (IPPD).

•

Focusing on step-function improvements in quality, waste minimization, and
customer response times.

•

Building strong supplier relationships through vertical partnering and teaming.

•

Using less design time, production cycle times, inventory, management layers,
and capital [30].

To implement lean practices nationally, aerospace corporations have formed the
LAI consortium and partnered themselves with key research institutions such as the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Air Force Institute of Technology. The
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consortium provides aerospace corporations, education institutions, and DoD partners a
collaborative environment to exchange knowledge and define areas of enabling lean
research. Appendix A lists the LAI member organizations as of October 1998. The LAI
consortium's initial vision and current charter is to "significantly reduce the cost and
cycle time for military aerospace systems throughout the value chain while continuing to
improve product performance" [31].
When first chartered, LAI stood for the Lean Aircraft Initiative. As more space
partners joined the team, LAI members quickly realized that lean principles can and
should be applied to space activities.

The LAI name was subsequently changed to

include the space sector, and in November 1997 the Lean Aerospace Initiative integration
team approved a proposal for confirmation by the commanders of the Air Force's
Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) and Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC).

2.3 The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM)
During the initial phases of the LAI program, the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM)
was created to define lean principles and practices, and is available as a software database
on the Internet. The LEM provides members of the LAI consortium a taxonomy defining
what "lean" is and how it may be applied to future lean efforts.
The LEM is available to LAI consortium members and is designed to organize
and disseminate research results to interested parties.
principles of lean thinking and the lean enterprise.

The model is based on the

The LEM is maintained at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and is populated by research-based benchmarking
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data derived from industry surveys, case studies, and other research activities. The model
is intended to help LAI members identify and assess "leanness" within their own
organizations and provides leverage for organizational change [31].

The LEM

incorporates the following principles:
a) Be responsive to change
b) Minimize waste
c) Do the right thing at the right place, the right time, and right quantity
d) Build effective relationships within the value stream
e) Strive for continuous improvement [24]
Defining LEM principles are broken down into the following twelve overarching
practices that can be applied to all commercial or defense enterprises:
1. Identify and Optimize Enterprise Flow. "Optimize the flow of products and
services, either affecting or within the process, from concept design through point
of use."
2. Assume Seamless Information Flow. "Provide processes for seamless and
timely transfer of and access to pertinent information."
3.

Optimize Capability and Utilization of People.

people are available when needed."
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"Assure properly trained

4. Make Decisions at the Lowest Possible Level. "Design the organizational
structure and management systems to accelerate and enhance decision making at
the point of knowledge, application, and need."
5. Implement Integrated Product and Process Development. "Create products
through an integrated team effort of people and organizations which are
knowledgeable of and responsible for all phases of the product's life cycle from
concept definition through development, production, deployment, operations and
support, and final disposal."
6. Develop Relationships Based on Mutual Trust and Commitment. "Establish
stable and on-going cooperative relationships within the extended enterprise,
encompassing both customers and suppliers."
7. Continuously Focus on the Customer. "Proactively understand and respond to
the needs of the internal and external customers."
8. Promote Lean Leadership at all Levels. "Align and involve all stakeholders to
achieve the enterprise's lean vision."
9. Maintain Challenge of Existing Processes. "Ensure a culture and systems that
use quantitative measurements and analysis to continuously improve processes."
10. Nurture a Learning Environment. "Provide for the development and growth
of both organizations' and individuals' support of attaining lean enterprise goals."
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11.

Ensure Process Capability and Maturation.

"Establish and maintain

processes capable of consistently designing and producing the key characteristics
of the product or service."
12. Maximize Stability in a Changing Environment. "Establish strategies to
maintain program stability in a changing customer driven environment." [32]
The LEM summary chart with metrics and enabling practices is found in
Appendix B.

Supporting practices and other data external to the model are available to

LAI members and maintained in the detailed online version of the LEM. While the LEM
is designed to tell users what lean is, it does not tell producers or operators how to get
lean.

Since leanness may be applied to different processes and measured by an

assortment of metrics, it is up to user organizations to apply lean approaches in their
systems engineering processes. Lean thinking forces organizations to consider not just
separate activities in a process, but the total enterprise. Only after the total enterprise is
identified can the inefficient or wasteful activities be improved or rooted out.

2.4 Lean Aerospace Initiative Space Research
Lean principles can be useful in any manufacturing process. While initial leanprocess studies focussed on the automotive industry, lean principles have since been
applied to a variety of systems where lower cost manufacturing and operations are
desired. For example, NASA is an organization facing downsizing quotas. To help
maintain its focus on its research and development roots, NASA has handed over its
Space Shuttle launch operations to a private consortium, United Space Alliance (USA), a
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joint venture of Lockheed Martin and Boeing [43]. By handing over its Shuttle launch
operations, the government expects to reduce its operating costs while better utilizing
downsized organizational resources. The USA contractor teams are also members of the
Lean Aerospace Initiative consortium. The transition of operations to the USA has led to
lean principles that are eliminating waste in the complicated Space Shuttle launch cycle.
Quality assurance research conducted by Mr. Gerald VerDuft at the California State
University at Dominguez Hills states that under a new USA system, workers at the lowest
logical level are being empowered to certify quality of work while 700 additional launch
processing tasks are being handed over from NASA to the USA staff [45:25]. Of course,
the challenge and primary concern for NASA is to maintain its focus on safety and
reliability while it converts to more efficient lean operations.
The NASA/USA example is an illustration of where some lean principles are
being applied to the space launch arena. Many defense firms are applying lean processes
across the board by improving on current manufacturing techniques and designing these
changes into future manufacturing designs and prototypes.
Perhaps one of the best reported examples of the use of lean principles in aircraft
design is Lockheed Martin's F-22 advanced fighter aircraft program. Lockheed's goal is
to use lean concepts to optimize manufacturing flow and eventually cut the F-22 delivery
times from 32 months to 24 months [25]. The team is determining long-lead production
items and is finding opportunities to remove them from the critical path to ultimately
optimize production flow.
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Another good example of lean manufacturing is how The Boeing Company has
improved the process of manufacturing bulkheads in its F/A-18 fighter aircraft. While an
aircraft bulkhead may not seem like a part requiring drastic changes in production
methods, production improvements in this critical part can be realized throughout the
complete aircraft system. The older FA-18 C/D model's bulkheads required a 90-piece
sheet metal build up, hundreds of specialized tools, and a long 29-day manufacturing
cycle. The new E/F model's bulkheads are now machined as a one-piece part and require
only eleven assembly tools and a fraction of the original manufacturing time. The new
bulkheads are also 7.5 pounds (3.4 kg) lighter than their predecessors. Most importantly,
fabrication of the new bulkheads saves time, money, and labor [15].

Boeing is

fundamentally changing the way it builds military aircraft and is incorporating lean
principles at the lowest common denominator.
Boeing's new lean manufacturing culture can trace many of its roots to the design
of the commercial 777-jetliner aircraft. The new lean practices introduced in the 777
project have had a significant impact on the award and implementation of subsequent
Boeing projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) [5]. Table 1 lists the differences in
the old and new ways Boeing is building its advanced aircraft. However, for the key
practices in Table 1 to become effective over the long run, management and workers
must maintain a commitment to the changing cultural environment. Employees also have
to be empowered by top management to make the cultural changes and build routines that
will eventually become standard practices.
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Table 1

Lean Approaches in JSF Prototype Design [15]

Old Practices

New Practices

Engineering drawings

100% Computer-based solid modeling

Physical mock-ups of designs

Computerized "virtual" designs

Paper-based assembly instructions

Computerized assembly simulation

"Hard" assembly tooling

Laser-designated positioning

Inspections at assembly milestones

Built-in process inspection

Foreman required at production level

Assign team leader

Functional organization of workers

Empowered integrated product teams

Similar lean principles are being applied to the development of the next
generation of spacelift vehicles.

In addition to manufacturing research, the LAI

consortium is attempting to capture lean practices in the operational space sector and has
outlined preliminary areas of interest to include:
a) Optimization of space system testing
b) Launch operations
c) Use of modeling and simulation to reduce spacecraft test spans
d) Lean practices in space asset command and control, including on-orbit
operations [46]
While all the proceeding topics present interesting research avenues, the thrust of
this study is on launch operations.
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2.5 Current Launch Practices, the Need for Lean
Even though current United States launch vehicles will be used beyond the year
2000, they are already operating at their maximum capabilities.

One reason for the

inherent inefficiency of today's launch systems is the heritage of their technologies.
Today's launch vehicles are primarily based on Cold War Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM) technology. Even the mighty Titan IV is a derivative of a 1950's-era
Titan ICBM. ICBMs were initially designed to carry small warheads into sub-orbital
trajectories, and early designers probably did not anticipate their systems being used to
launch sophisticated satellites into low-earth (LEO) or geosynchronous (GEO) orbits.
Basic acquisition strategy states that to minimize development costs, it is
desirable to meet new missions by first modifying existing systems and then
reconfiguring associated operating procedures or tactics. This concept is easily seen in
the role the Air Force's B-52 bomber aircraft has played in the last half-century. The
B-52 has transformed from a high-altitude, nuclear weapon platform to a low-altitude
conventional weapon delivery system as seen in the latest B-52H model. While today's
constant upgrades may prove a viable and cheaper solution for bombers, the same is no
longer holding true for the current fleet of launch vehicles.

The fact that the United

States has been able to convert nuclear delivery systems into useful and rather
sophisticated launch systems is a testament to progress and peace, but such progress has
come with a price.
Air Force Space Command has declared that continued production, operation, and
maintenance of today's launch vehicles are cost ineffective for two reasons. The first is
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the escalating expenses associated with inefficient launch systems and their extensive
infrastructures. The second is due to outdated launch system technologies, designs, and
manufacturing techniques [4:6]. To complicate matters, national spaceport facilities,
processes, procedures, and launch infrastructures are not standardized.

Even though

Cape Canaveral Air Station and Vandenberg Air Force base may launch similar systems
(i.e., Titan IV, Atlas II and Delta II systems), launch procedures and infrastructures are
different for each base. The non-standard logistics that is required for unique systems in
each facility have produced one-of-a-kind range hardware. The knowledge base required
for operating and maintaining each unique system is also eroding as more technicians
retire or leave the ranges. To keep up with this declining knowledge base, increasingly
specialized training is required to operate and maintain the variety of equipment. The Air
Force also estimates that today there are more than 25,000 outdated range components
with no sources of spares [21:41]. It projects that future requirements for existing launch
systems combined with further equipment obsolescence and increased training
requirements will drive costs beyond budgetary limitations. Table 2 is an Air Force
subtask assessment of current launch services.

The following sections highlight

operation areas listed in the table that need increased consideration for improvement.
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Table 2

Air Force Spacelift Deployment Subtask Assessment [21:42]
^Capabilities

Capable

Operable

Ability to perform How responsive
and maintainable
required tasks
is the system?

Reliable

Economical

Ability to
initiate and
complete tasks.

Efficiently operate,
sustain, and evolve
capabilities

Overall
Rating

Tasks
Generate
the
Launch Mission

W

Execute the
Launch
Mission

@:

Perform
Post-Launch
Operations
Employ
the Launch
Ranges

Spacecraft
Initialization

®

I

(A)', Adequate Capability ßj^A Limited Capability
^^

2.5.1

^
i Declining Capability

Launch Mission Generation
Current launch systems lack standard payload interfaces. Separate payloads on

the same vehicle may require different interface configurations. Individual interfaces add
complexity to launch processing and require high levels of skill to craft the unique parts.
With increased launch requirements and the need for reduced cycle times, such
specialized production of vehicle-payload interfaces hinders the overall responsiveness of
the launch fleet.
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2.5.2

Launch Mission Execution
The current launch fleet has an impressive record of successfully delivering

payloads to orbit. Figure 2 lists recent success records of the latest versions of U.S.
expendable launch vehicles through fiscal year 1998.

Titan IV
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«w
■ Launch
Success (%)

1
Delta II

D Number of
Launches

i
Atlas II

r'r"~ ,

0

Figure 2
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Launch Success Rate for Modern ELVs [1]

Even though launch providers are successfully launching payloads into orbit, the
execution of the launch process remains in question.

Current launch execution is labor

intensive and again, nonstandard across the board for different launch vehicle systems.
The labor-intensive operations and increasing tempo of launch requirements are cause for
concern in a shrinking Air Force [21:40].
The choice of launch propellant is also becoming an increasingly significant issue
to operators. Operations with vehicles using large amounts of solid propellant such as the
Titan and Delta systems are becoming more and more restrictive due to the toxic nature
of launch exhaust products. Launch ranges must run launch-day risk assessments that
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model the vehicle exhaust and predict chemical concentration levels. If these levels are
too high and pose a risk to the environment, wildlife, or outlying population centers, the
launch will be postponed until meteorological conditions are more favorable [21:40].
Operations at Vandenberg, AFB, California are especially susceptible to environmental
delays.

Strict California laws require a broad array of environmental assessments,

restrictions, and fees. However necessary, these additional requirements complicate the
launch process, require more manpower to manage, increase launch costs, and run the
risk of delays that affect launch availability and responsiveness.

2.5.3 Post-Launch Operations
Activities after a launch may have low-visibility in the scope of a launch process,
but are nonetheless crucial for sustained operations. Refurbishment activities are
manpower-intensive and costly.

Launch pads must be inspected, repaired and

refurbished to pre-launch conditions. Post launch refurbishment typically takes seven to
20 days, depending on the damage [21:41].

2.5.4 Launch Range Employment
Again, the non-standard nature of the ranges and launch systems adds complexity,
costs, and large amounts of specialized equipment, training, and logistics.

As a result,

operations and maintenance costs for the ranges are on the order of $400M to $500M per
year [21:41]. The current launch-range infrastructure also makes it impossible to support
multiple operations. For example, the ranges are currently incapable of conducting two
separate "wet-dress rehearsals" simultaneously. Wet-dress rehearsals are required
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procedures and include pumping propulsion fluids into the launch vehicles on the pad and
are sometimes followed by a full, simulated countdown.

2.5.5 Spacecraft Initialization
The ability to support future systems on existing ranges is limited.

Any new

launch or support system introduced requires extensive modifications to the existing
range infrastructure. Currently, every new launch cycle involves significant software and
often hardware modifications.

This requires a high level of skilled operators and

engineers to prepare the range for each launch. With each new launch procedure and set
of modifications, the ranges incur high rehearsal and training costs [21:42]. With a new
set of launch vehicles planned for the next decade, many of the existing launch
deficiencies can be viewed as opportunities for change.

2.6 Future Launch Requirements
In the global drive to make systems "better, cheaper, and faster," lean processes
must be infused into current launch operations while preparing for planned future
developments. Data, from a 1997 study gathered by the Aerospace Corporation for
NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center and Headquarters Air Force Space Command [2],
shows that there is no better time than the present to optimize the current launch
operations infrastructure, technologies, and systems.

Table 3 lists anticipated U.S.

spacelift requirements in the year 2000 to 2010 time frame.
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Table 3
LEO Payload
Small

Near-Term Spacelift Requirements [2:46]

Military

Civil
4 to 8 per year

1 to 2 per year

(<5000 lbm)

(experiments,
weather)

Commercial

Total

16 to 32 per year
(LEO com. sats)

21 to 42 per year

22 to 49 per year
Medium

Heavy

7 to 11 per year

1 to 4 per year

2 to 3 per year

1 every 4 or 5
years

(expendable)

(Cassini type)

4 to 6 per year

30 to 64 per year

6 to 10 per year

(GEO com. sats.)

7 to 8 per year

Heavy
(Space Shuttle)

(LEO, GEO com
sats)

—

(Space Station
missions)

—

7 to 8 per year

To put these launch requirements in an economic perspective, Figure 3 depicts the
anticipated markets in the same time frame for launch services by sector.
Based on these economic forecasts, the largest space transportation market in the
2000 to 2010 time frame is in commercial medium lift operations. This sector includes
the Lockheed Martin's Atlas II, Boeing's Delta II and III, the Russian Proton, and the
French Ariane V class of launch systems. Flight rates are increasing in the medium-lift
sector and will continue to grow as new payloads are lifted into orbit and existing
constellations are replenished with new satellites. The projected 30 to 64 launches per
year in the 2000 to 2010 time frame for U.S. systems is nearly double that of a 1996
capability of 27 launches [2:48].
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Using historical flight rates of existing Atlas and Delta systems, the Aerospace
study forecasts that the combined maximum rates the two systems can deliver in the near
future will be approximately 29 flights per year. Including future medium-class Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) and Sea Launch estimates, the forecasted flight rate
per year for U.S. systems is 58 launches [2:60]. To meet a medium-ELV demand of 30
to 64 launches per year, launch providers need to build operation enterprises that are
better and faster than today's. Of course, any lean practices applied to today's medium
lift launch operations should pay off in increased savings for future payload customers
and ultimately increased revenue for the launch providers themselves.
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3

Launch Operations Research and Analysis

To capture the essence of this thesis and show how lean principles can be applied
to current launch operation enterprises, the following chapter focuses on the actual launch
process. It begins with a generic methodology that describes the core activities in a basic
launch operations enterprise. With this in mind, two medium-lift launch operations are
covered. The first is a general description of the Russian Proton launch system, and the
second is an in-depth case study highlighting Boeing Delta II launch operations. Both
launch operation systems employ significant lean practices and can serve as models for
operators searching for improvements in their launch enterprises.

3.1 The Launch Operations Enterprise
A launch vehicle undergoes a series of complex preparation activities before it
ultimately sends its payload into space. Figure 4 represents the scope of the launch
operations process. The outside ring depicts common activities required in the launch
process. The inside ring lists the important parameters, or enterprise level metrics, that
can be applied to launch activities. Launch metrics and applications are discussed in
greater detail in the following sections.
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Vehicle
Assembly

Payload Mating/Integration

Fairing
Encapsulation

Pre-launch Ops
and Countdown

Standardization

Propellant
Loading

System Checks/
Battery Charging

Figure 4

3.1.1

Launch
Rehearsal

Reliability

Transfer to
Launch Pad

Launch Operations Network

Enterprise Metrics
A typical set of parameters, or enterprise level metrics, can be applied to most

launch enterprises.

The launch activities depicted in Figure 4 may provide a basic

framework for launch operations, but the extent of their "leanness" is commonly
measured by the following metrics.

3.1.1.1

Cost
Launch cost is perhaps the most important metric to launch providers and payload

customers alike. Launch cost includes all costs needed to launch a payload into orbit and
the costs to support the launch operations infrastructure.
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Air Force Space Command led a mission area planning (MAP) team to evaluate
current U.S. launch operations and listed six prioritized space launch deficiencies [44].
The primary deficiency is costly launch systems. The current cost of launch vehicles, in
terms of dollars per pound of payload delivered to orbit, ranges from $5,000 to over
$15,000 per pound [44:19]. Additionally, recurring costs of maintaining and sustaining
existing launch range infrastructures increase overall expenditures. These high costs are
forcing launch operators and providers to design leaner launch systems and supporting
enterprises that meet future cost goals. As part of NASA's strategic research framework,
future space access goals have been identified. These goals are to [42]:
•

Reduce the payload cost to low-Earth orbit by an order of magnitude, from
$10,000 to $1,000 per pound, within 10 years.

•

Reduce the payload cost to low-Earth orbit by an additional order of
magnitude, from $1,000 to $100 per pound, by 2020.

Similarly, Air Force objectives for the next generation of launch vehicles include
life cycle and annual fixed costs that are 50% less than the current operations [4:23]. The
use of lean practices in launch system design and operations can increase customer
savings by eliminating non value-added activities in the launch process.

3.1.1.2

On-Pad Time
On-pad time is another metric used in the launch business and is usually

calculated in days. On-pad time is a primary measurement for Air Force space launch
squadrons when determining launch service provider award fees [11]. This is an example
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of the customer creating and measuring value. However, reducing on-pad time should be
just as important to the launch customer. Logically, every minute a payload sits on the
pad is a minute wasted in space. This becomes a concern with commercial payload
customers who are dependent on the immediate revenue the payload will provide once in
orbit. Some customers lose millions of dollars per day in potential revenue when their
payloads are confined to a launch pad [49].
It is also important to minimize on-pad time to maintain government launch
responsiveness and mission flexibility. Even though commercial payloads are occupying
an increasing amount of United States launch pads, those pads are still owned by the U.S.
government and may be needed to support short notice space missions.
Given that on-pad time is a widely used metric and key indicator for launch
provider performance, one should understand its conditional value. Launch service
providers may extend the time a vehicle is on-pad if there are no imminent situations
requiring the use of a launch pad or no near-term requirements on the launch manifest.
While launch providers may not need the extra time to complete on-pad operations, they
may take advantage of the flexibility in the launch schedule and spread work resources to
other activities in the launch process. Adjusting production flow times to meet customer
demand is defined as controlling activity "takt" time [48:55]. However, launch providers
must first have a clear understanding of their launch enterprise activities and the times
associated with each activity before takt time can be considered and launch operations
synchronized with customer demand.

3-4

3.1.1.3

Launch Rate
Launch rate is measured in launches per month or year and usually controlled by

the launch manifest. The manifest is the primary scheduling tool of upcoming launches
used by launch providers to synchronize their operations flow.

Launch rates vary

according to customer requirements and tend to be higher in years with population of new
satellite constellations or increased replenishment activities. Maximum launch rates are
good indicators of a launch provider's efficiency of operations and its ability to respond
to increased demand.

3.1.1.4 Reliability
Launch vehicle reliability is usually expressed as the probability that a launch
vehicle will deliver a payload to orbit. Expendable launch systems are generally rated
according to their launch successes, failures, or partial failures. Complete launch success
is typically defined as a vehicle delivering its payload safely into its intended orbit.
Launches are usually termed failures when a catastrophic system failure occurs, while a
partial failure would be delivering a payload to an orbit other than the one intended, thus
reducing its useful life.

3.1.1.5 Schedule Slips
Schedule slips can be an indicator of the level of leanness in a launch operations
enterprise. While some slips are unavoidable due to weather and other uncontrollable
circumstances, others may be a direct reflection of the overall operations effectiveness.
If a schedule slip occurs while a vehicle is being processed on the launch pad, the delay
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could have a ripple effect and ultimately affect other systems waiting for use of the pad.
An Air Force Scientific Advisory Board study states that that the existing launch
infrastructure is inefficient and has caused launch delays that have tripled in the last two
years [12]. This study recommended modernization and streamlining of launch facilities
to reduce schedule slips.

3.1.1.6 Standardization
Operation

standardization

helps

streamline

launch-processing

flow.

Standardization metrics are applied to the number of common systems, operating
procedures, or launch processing activities across the board for a given launch system,
combination of systems, or launch sites.

Properly standardized launch systems and

launch support operations decrease overall logistics and support costs, streamline
training, and provide a common foundation for continued process maturation.

3.1.1.7 Safety
In a drive to build better, faster, and cheaper systems, safety is a metric launch
providers will not compromise. Boeing is one company that regularly monitors safety
incidents and actively pursues a 100% safety record across the board for its launch
personnel [5]. In designing lean practices, safety should still be a primary consideration.
In addition to launch vehicle processing techniques, launch safety analyses and
procedures can be applied to launch hazard assessments, vehicle failure modes and
effects modeling, launch trajectory simulations, and intelligent range safety systems.
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3.1.1.8 Responsiveness and Availability
As previously mentioned, an Air Force Mission Area Plan (MAP) listed the
primary deficiency in U.S. launch operations as costly launch vehicles. Scoring a very
close second was unresponsive spacelift operations [44:19].

Launch system

responsiveness is the ability to meet additional demands for rapid augmentation of onorbit assets through increased launch rates [27].

Launch responsiveness is also

commonly considered a measure of flexibility in a launch operation enterprise and
includes factors such as launch availability, vehicle reliability, and a launch provider's
surge-rate capacity. Joseph Loftus and Charles Teixeira from NASA Johnson Space
Center [29:672] define expected launch availability as a function of vehicle reliability,
production capacity, the ability of the launch operations infrastructure to support a
desired launch rate, existing launch commitments, and demonstrated stand-down times
following a failure.

This measure of launch availability can be expressed by the

following relationship:
A = l-[L(l-R)Td/(l-l/S)],
where R is the vehicle's reliability (section 3.1.1.4), L is the nominal or scheduled yearly
launch rate, Td is the demonstrated (or estimated) stand-down time after a failure (in
years), and S is the surge rate capacity over and above the planned launch rate (e.g.
5=1.25 means the system can achieve a flight rate 25% higher than the planned launch
rate, L).
The MAP study states that launch availability and responsiveness of current
expendable launchers have had little effect on existing launch dates since payloads are
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typically not standing ready for launch. Nevertheless, if contingency operations demand
a rapid augmentation of on-orbit assets, current launch systems will be unable to meet
those requirements [44:19]. In building leaner launch enterprises, launch providers need
to design more responsive systems in order to protect our nation's vital space interests.

3.1.2

Launch Activities and Enterprise Flow
Before activities in the launch process can be determined as value-added, a launch

model must be identified to illustrate a sequence of launch activities. Figure 5 depicts the
flow of typical launch activities, regardless of launch vehicle or payload. As seen in the
figure, launch processing generally consists of two parallel processes for booster
assembly and spacecraft/payload preparation.

A tertiary set of ongoing activities

throughout the processing cycle usually includes provider and customer interactions,
meetings, and working groups.

Common documentation products include interface

requirements documents (IRDs) and interface control documents (ICDs).
Timelines vary for each launch activity in the cycle and are dependent on
external, operational, and infrastructure factors. Overall process efficiency depends on
the initial systems architecture put in place to support the launch mission. Early launch
center architects in the 1960's most likely did not realize the impact their designs would
have on launch operations so many decades into the future. For example, the culture of
the former Soviet Union significantly shaped current Russian launch operations.
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Launch Enterprise Flow Activities [27]

Like the United States, Russians view space access as vital to their national
security. Frequent and reliable access to space was key to the former Soviet Union from
the outset of the "space race." Since launching its first satellite, the Sputnik 1, the Soviet
Union became dependent on its space assets to maintain global communications, monitor
Russian borders, and to keep an eye on their Cold War adversary, the United States. The
early Soviet satellites did not have the same mean-time-between-failures (MTBFs) and
redundant systems as their American counterparts [27]. Instead of engineering satellites
to stay in orbit for longer durations, the Soviets designed their launch infrastructure for
constant re-supply and replenishment of their constellations.

The harsh weather

conditions of its launch centers also helped drive Soviet launch processing.
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Reducing

rocket on-pad time was a necessity to minimize weather exposure to the sensitive
payloads.

Therefore, it was necessary to assemble rocket bodies off-pad and the

horizontal "assembly line" operations were developed as a result. Combined with the
military strategy of constant satellite re-supply and the need for horizontal processing, the
Soviet engineers helped develop a process that many today consider a benchmark for
launch processing [27]. At their peak, the Soviet Union was launching over 100 vehicles
per year, still an astounding feat for any space-capable nation [27]. The Russian launch
infrastructure designed behind the Iron Curtain is now considered one of the most
optimized flow operations in the space launch business. It wasn't until the end of the
Cold War that the Americans could "capitalize" on the Russian launch processes.

3.2 The Proton Launch Process - A Russian Perspective
The following section briefly addresses the Russian Proton launch processing
operations. While Russian systems engineers did not have the Lean Aerospace Initiative
and its practices in mind when designing their launch operations flow, they built a launch
concept with many practices that are considered "lean" and can serve as a model for
optimizing current and future launch activities.

3.2.1

Proton History
The Russian Proton launch vehicle is considered one of the most capable

expendable launchers in service today. It has been a mainstay medium-lift vehicle for
Russian operations since 1970. The western world got its first glimpse of the Proton
launch vehicle in 1984 when it lifted two Vega probes to Haley's comet in December of
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that year [23:132]. The Proton comes in three-stage (D-l) or four stage (D-l-e) variants
with the fourth stage used to insert payloads into orbit and interplanetary trajectories.
The three-stage D-l model can lift approximately 44,100 lbm (20,003 kg) to a 185 km
circular orbit and the four-stage D-l-e model can lift approximately 12,100 lbm (5,488
kg) to a geosynchronous transfer orbit at a 28.5 deg inclination [23:133]. The lower three
stages of the D-l-e are identical to those of the three-stage D-l. The configuration of the
four-stage D-l-e is depicted in Figure 6.
The Proton's launch rate grew from six launches in 1970 to a peak of thirteen in
1985 [23:133]. Based on information furnished by the Aerospace Corporation, launch
reliability for the Proton D-l and D-l-3e program since 1970 is approximately 88% and
includes a reliability record of approximately 92% over the last 50 launches [1]. The
increase in launch reliability in recent years has made the Proton system a commercially
viable option for today's global launch market. Supporting Proton launch success data is
listed in Appendix C.
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Payload
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The fourth stage is equipped with
one liquid propellant rocket engine
developing 86kN of thrust, and two
micro-engine clusters for attitude
control and orbital insertion maneuvers

RD-58M

The third stage is equipped with one
fixed single-chamber liquid propellant
rocket engine developing 0.6 MN thrust
and one liquid propellant control rocket
engine, with four gimbaled nozzles,
developing 30 kN thrust.

The second stage is equipped with four
gimbaled single-chamber liquid propellant
rocket engines developing a total thrust
of 2.3 MN

RD-0210

Core
Oxidizer
Tank
The first stage is equipped with six gimbaled
single-chamber liquid propellant rocket
engines developing a total thrust of 9 MN

Figure 6

3.2.2

Proton/Block DM (D-l-e) Staging Elements [22:2-10]

Proton Launch Operations
All Proton launches are conducted at the Baikonur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam in

the Republic of Kazakhstan. The average annual temperature is 55 deg Fahrenheit (12.8
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deg Celsius), and ranges from extremes of - 40 degrees Fahrenheit (- 40 deg Celsius) in
the winter to 113 degrees Fahrenheit (45 deg Celsius) in the summer [22:9-1]. Unlike
United States launch sites, the Baikonur climate requires a very high level of protection
from the elements for both launch vehicles and their payloads. Launch analysts consider
Baikonur climate conditions as a major factor in designing the Russian launch operations
flow where all assembly and integration activities of the Proton launch vehicle stages are
completed indoors [27].

Assembly and integration of the launch vehicle stages are

performed horizontally, off-pad, and in special climate-controlled facilities. Even the
payload is mated to the fourth stage vertically off the pad and rotated to the horizontal for
fairing encapsulation. The encapsulated payload and fourth stage is then loaded onto a
climate-controlled railcar and shipped to a separate horizontal facility where it is mated to
the launch vehicle. The complete launch system is shipped on a transporter-erector cart
(Figure 7) and delivered to the pad four to five days from the launch day.

Figure 7

Proton Transporter Erector System [22:9-47]
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Figure 8 depicts the generalized order of operations of the Proton launch process
for western payloads launched at the Baikonur site.
Baikonur Cosmodrome

Spacecraft Supplier

Figure 8

Proton Ground Operations Flow [22:9-16]

This "assembly-line" format of processing launch vehicles and their payloads is
very different from United States methods. While current U.S. expendable vehicles tie
up launch pads from 21 to over 100 days, the Russian Proton system occupies the pad for
only four to five days. Since the Proton flow minimizes on-pad operations, the majority
of launch vehicle components are tested and processed off the launch cycle's critical
path. This adds flexibility in launch resource availability and builds in a higher level of
responsiveness in the total launch operations enterprise. Figure 9 shows an overview of
the Proton launch site operational flow for western customers.

It is rather remarkable

that customers can arrive at Baikonur and launch their satellites in little over a month.
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Even more remarkable is that the Russians have sustained this same process flow time
and flexible launch enterprise for nearly thirty years [27].
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■ Proton installation on
launch pad
■ General SC checkout
on launch pad
• General testing and
preparation of launch
vehicle
• Air conditioning and
batteries charge hookup
• Electrical tests of SC

Prepare SC for fueling
and transfer to
fueling hall

L-3 Days
Integrated spacecraft
and launch vehicle test

L-2 Days
Flight Readiness Review

L-l » L-0 Days

Countdown
and launch

Russian Proton Payload Process Flow [22:2-16]

Launch providers in the United States have studied the Russian launch processing
system and are applying many of those practices to current and future launch system
designs. The Missiles and Space Division of Lockheed Martin has partnered with the
Proton's builder and fourth-stage supplier companies, Khrunichev and Energia, to form
International Launch Services (ELS) to market commercial Proton launch services [22:11]. EELV designs from Lockheed and Boeing utilize many of the same efficient launch
processes as the Proton system (such as horizontal processing and minimized pad
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operations) and will fundamentally change the United States launch business. However,
U.S. expendable launch operators and contractors are not necessarily waiting for EELVs
before building lean launch enterprises.

The following section highlights the lean

improvements Boeing has implemented in its current medium-lift expendable operations.

3.3 Boeing Delta II Case Study
Current launch processes present many opportunities for improvement. Launch
operators are starting to recognize these opportunities and are working to implement lean
initiatives that will pay off in higher launch rates, streamlined flow operations, and higher
success rates. The launch business market itself is forcing operators to think and act lean.
The Boeing Company, with its Delta II and El family of launch vehicles, is already
employing lean principles in its launch processes.

The following section is an

introduction to the Delta II and III launch systems and is followed by a case study that
highlights Boeing's lean launch practices.

3.3.1

Delta II and III
The Boeing Delta II is a medium capacity expendable launch vehicle and a

derivative of the original McDonnell Douglas Aerospace's Delta vehicle launched in
1960.

Including the maiden flight of the Delta III in August of 1998, there have since

been 242 successful Delta launches out of 262 giving the Delta-family a success rate of
94.3% [9]. Figure 10 depicts the evolution of the Delta rocket family.
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Figure 10 Delta Launch Vehicle Evolution [33:1-2]

Delta rockets come configured in two or three stages depending on mission
requirements. The medium Delta II rocket is augmented by its smaller strap-on solid
graphite epoxy motors (GEMs) that can be configured in clusters of three, four, or nine
depending on mission requirements. With nine GEMs, the latest Delta II7925 model can
lift a substantial 4,010 lbm(1819 kg) to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO).
The Delta El is Boeing's latest launch vehicle and is its first large vehicle
developed wholly with private funds. The Delta IE is a modified Delta II, but is most
distinguishable by the widened interface on the first stage that facilitates integration of a
completely new second stage. The Delta II' s second and third stages are replaced by one
cryogenic oxygen/hydrogen upper stage capable of 25,000 lbf (111,205 N) thrust. Unlike
the Delta II, three of the nine Delta Ill's Alliant Techsystems GEMs are fitted with a
thrust vector control system to enhance vehicle maneuverability and control. Delta III

3-17

produces 1,099,540 lbf (4,891,000 N) of thrust from the core engine and six solid rocket
strap-on motors and can carry 8,500 lbm (3,855 kg) of payload into geosynchronous
transfer orbit [13].
Boeing launches the Delta systems from two government-owned launch pads at
Space Launch Complex (SLC) 17 at Cape Canaveral Air Station (CCAS) and one pad at
SLC 2, Vandenberg AFB (VAFB). The Delta III is only launched from the specially
modified SLC17-B pad at Cape Canaveral.
As a launch provider for government missions, Boeing used the Delta II ELV to
launch all 24 satellites of the Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation and
currently holds an Air Force contract for replacement satellites through the year 2002.
The Delta II also successfully launched NASA's Mars Global Surveyor and Mars
Pathfinder systems, Mars Orbiter-2, Mars Polar Lander-1, and the recent NASA Stardust
probe. Notable commercial Delta II launches involved boosting the majority of the
Motorola's Iridium global telecommunications network and initial Globalstar system
satellites [9].
The Delta Ill's maiden launch on August 26, 1998 carried a Hughes Galaxy-X
commercial communication satellite and was unsuccessful.

Boeing engineers are

confident they can prevent the same incident in the future by changing the flight control
software [8]. Lessons learned from the first Delta HI flight will be used for the basis of
improving future launches as part of Boeing's lean practice of continuous improvement
and process maturation.
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3.3.2 Delta II Operations at CCAS, Florida - A Study in Lean
As with most U.S. industries, it is uncommon to find an aerospace company than
can be considered a completely lean enterprise.

Nevertheless, many companies are

beginning to implement lean practices within their space operations. Boeing is such a
company with a goal of implementing lean launch operations ranging in activities from
vehicle fabrication to the final lift-off. The following sections are based on the findings
of a site-survey performed by the author in November 1998 on Delta II launch operations
at Cape Canaveral Air Station and published in the form of a case study. Supporting
operational examples in the study are only a small representation of the many lean
practices that providers can integrate into their launch operations.

While it proved

impractical and infeasible for Boeing management to comment on every single activity in
the launch process, the examples and philosophies in the case study show how smarter
and leaner practices contribute to improving launch operation enterprises.

3.3.2.1

Company Philosophy
As mentioned earlier, the Delta launch system was initially produced and operated

by McDonnell Douglas Aerospace until the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger of 1997.
McDonnell Douglas' published vision from the outset of the Delta program was to be
recognized as "an empowered, accountable, flexible, highly responsive, self-disciplined
launch team that is committed to being the benchmark worldwide in space launch
operations" [33:1].

Included in this empowered launch team are the Delta launch

managers, operators, technicians, support crew, and ultimately the customer. While their
vision statement is very optimistic, the Delta launch team has implemented significant
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organizational and physical changes to their operations while on their journey to become
a lean enterprise.
Acceptance to change and improvement are historical parts of the Delta team's
corporate culture. The senior launch site manager at CCAS, Philip Payne, nurtured much
of the corporate culture in the late 1970's and is considered the father of the Delta's lean
concepts of operations.

He had a reputation for challenging his team to continually

optimize operations flow [34]. Mr. Payne created the current work plan that helped
identify and baseline Delta launch operations. He also instilled a strong corporate culture
that is still followed by the current launch team management.
Today's Delta launch culture promotes leadership that motivates all stakeholders
to achieve the company's goals while focusing on customer requirements. This author
could easily sense the confidence Boeing management has in its Delta launch operation
system. Perhaps the best test of a company's cultural confidence is allowing a researcher
to fully investigate and document their lean processes. A parallel example from the
automotive industry is Toyota Motor Company. Toyota was so confident in their lean
production techniques that they allowed competitors to make "pilgrimages" to Hiroshima
and Toyota City in the late 1970's and 1980's to learn of lean manufacturing and
production [47:237].

3.3.2.2

Delta Operational Flow
Before a Delta launch vehicle lifts off from its pad, it undergoes a sophisticated

logistics process as portrayed in Figure 11.
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Sacramento, CA

CCAS Florida

Figure 11

Delta Vehicle Operational Flow (Eastern Range) [17]

Delta launch vehicles are primarily manufactured or processed by four main Boeing
divisions. The tanks, major assemblies, and electronics suites are mainly built at the
Boeing facility in Huntington Beach, California. The Delta II's staple first-stage RS-27
engine is manufactured at the Boeing-Rocketdyne Division in Canoga Park, California.
These major components are then shipped to Pueblo, Colorado where they are mated with
the Delta II booster, spin table, interstage, and payload attachment fairing (PAF). Metal
fairings are built in Pueblo while composite fairings are built in Huntington Beach.
Vehicle and fairings are then shipped to the launch centers where payload integration,
checkout, and final launch processing activities are performed.
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Boeing's suppliers are integral partners in the process of optimizing vehiclemanufacturing flow.

The Delta II second stage engine is built by GenCorp Aerojet in

Sacramento, California and delivered to Pueblo, Colorado. The strap-on GEMs are built
by Alliant Techsystems in Magna, Utah, and delivered to the final launch site at either
VAFB or CCAS.

The upper-stage motors are built by Thiokol Systems in Elkton,

Maryland and are also delivered to the final launch site. B.F. Goodrich Aerospace in
Albuquerque, New Mexico manufactures the Delta II Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
telemetry system. Cincinnati Electronics builds the Command Receiver Destruct (CRD)
system while Allied Signal Aerospace in Teterboro, New Jersey manufactures the RTFCA
(Redundant Inertial Flight Control Assembly) guidance system. With the exception of
the upper stage motors that have a rather long shelf life and are delivered in quantities of
three to four, all major sub-systems are built according to the launch manifest and kept by
Boeing at minimal to zero inventory amounts [34]. Each set of electronic boxes also has
a separate delivery schedule based on launch manifest requirements.
Once the rocket assembly and major vehicle sub-components arrive at their final
destinations, they are processed and prepared for launch. The next section highlights the
historical changes in the Delta launch processing cycle at Cape Canaveral Air Station that
has contributed to reducing the cycle time on the pad from 40 to approximately 21 days.
Similar initiatives are in place at the Vandenberg launch facility.
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3.3.2.3 Delta Launch Cycle Time Reduction
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1.2, launch cycle on-pad time is probably one of the
best and most used indicators of "leanness." Figure 12 depicts the reduction of on-pad
workdays for the Delta II since the mid-1980's.
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Figure 12 Delta II Cycle Time Capability

One of the major principles in the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) states that a lean
enterprise organization will continuously focus on the customer [32]. In fact, focussing
on the commercial customer is becoming the key driver for implementing leaner launch
operations for many launch service providers. A significant year for the Delta launch
team was 1989. This was the first year of operations for the second-generation Delta II
launch vehicle. It was also a year of increased demand due to the initial population of the
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NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) constellation. During this period,
McDonnell Douglas began to seriously concentrate on its commercial launch business.
The Delta II launched its first commercial payload in 1989.

It carried a British

broadcasting satellite, the BSB-R1.
In the five years preceding 1989, the extremely low launch rate (approximately
zero to three per year) and greatly reduced crew size supported a cycle time baseline of
approximately 40 workdays. Crew size was doubled in 1988 to support the move of the
Delta's primary mission checkout center from Huntington Beach, California, to Cape
Canaveral. This also established an initial launch capability for the GPS constellation.
The additional work force allowed the launch processing cycle to be compressed by six
workdays, primarily by repackaging more work for expanded second shift operations.
This helped decrease the Delta's launch processing baseline to approximately 34 days
[34].

More importantly, the initial exercise helped launch operators start to identify,

quantify, and optimize the launch-operations enterprise flow. Within a year, manifest
requirements mandated even more reductions in the Delta launch processing cycles.
Perhaps the best tool that signifies customer "pull" in the launch community is the
upcoming launch schedule, or manifest.

To meet demand, the Delta management

continued with a series of streamlining phases that would incrementally reduce the onpad time to today's 23 to 21 workday capability. The following sections break down
these incremental changes into their streamlining phases and relate them to the Lean
Enterprise Model where applicable.
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3.3.2.3.1

Phase I Streamlining - Identify and Optimize Operations Flow

In order to pursue new commercial business launch opportunities while still
meeting the US AF GPS launch commitments, the Delta management and technician team
began a systematic program of cycle time reductions. One of the best lean-enabling
practices when identifying and optimizing enterprise flow is to generate models,
simulations, and procedures that permit understanding and evaluation of the operational
flow process [32]. The Delta team realized this in 1989 and concentrated on analyzing
pad qualification and pre-launch procedures.

The team then designed smarter test

equipment that would run the flight simulations while integrating pre-launch tests off pad
when possible. For example, the hydraulics simulation "flights" were moved to the
primary Delta Mission Checkout Center (DMCO) at Cape Canaveral where the boosters
could be prepped off-pad. The DMCO usually has two horizontal boosters that are "on
deck" and are prepped for launch while two more boosters occupy the launch pads. Since
the unassembled boosters occupy floor space at DMCO early in their launch cycle, they
present perfect opportunities for early inspection and testing.
In the first year of the Phase I, procedural changes associated with navigation and
control system testing reduced on-pad time by one work week, from 34 days to 29 days
[34]. Additionally, many of these tests were moved off-pad to DMCO. Before relocating
these tests to DMCO, technicians had to break into launch-qualified systems on the pad
to test the navigation electronics and gyros.
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Phase I improvements ultimately allowed the Delta team to further identify and
optimize their operations flow. During this first-cut streamlining phase, the team was
able to shave five days from the launch-processing schedule.

3.3.2.3.2

Phase II Streamlining - Infrastructure/Facility Improvements

As part of Phase II streamlining objectives, the Delta team reconsidered the way it
processed the crucial pressure systems in the Delta II vehicle. The vehicle's second stage
is comprised of a pressure-fed system that depends on two high-pressure subsystems.
The first is a 4,350 psi (29,992 kPa) helium-gas system that is regulated to approximately
260 psi (1,792 kPa) to drive the propellants (Aerozine 50 fuel and N204 oxidizer) into the
engine.

The second is a 4,350 psi (29,992 kPa) nitrogen-gas system regulated to 275 psi

(1,896 kPa) that feeds the redundant-attitude-control-system (RACS) to provide roll
control during powered flight and roll, pitch, and yaw control during unpowered flight.
Before the streamlining process, these systems were checked and tested on the launch
pad. If they failed during testing, technicians would have to unbraze and disconnect the
pressure tubing and fittings that were welded onto the vehicle. The Delta system uses an
ultrasonic brazing process that flows a liquid alloy through fittings to permanently braze
the system shut, thereby preventing leaks and failures during flight. Of course, tearing
into a flight-ready vehicle to repair a failed test is unfavorable and introduces risk into
other sub-systems as well as infusing unnecessary retest days in the launch flow.
Furthermore, high-pressure leak-checks are deemed hazardous operations and require
"clear-pad" conditions that preclude completion of any concurrent work on the pad.
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Testing of these systems alone required three days, two of which were under clear-pad
conditions.
To eliminate the unfavorable circumstances of testing the second stage pressure
systems on the pad, a separate Area 55 high-pressure test facility was built to run the
required pre-launch propulsion leak and flow tests.

High-pressure tests can now be

performed before the vehicle is assembled. This reduces vehicle on-pad time, and allows
technicians to test crucial pressure systems early in the launch processing cycle. Any
necessary repairs are now performed without endangering other launch system timelines.
Figure 13 identifies the flow of flight hardware to Area 55 and other launch processing
facilities at Cape Canaveral.
In addition to the high-pressure test facility initiatives, the Delta team reviewed
how they ran pad qualification tests for each mission. Before Phase II streamlining, the
launch vehicle's transducers and sensors were calibrated to the mission control facility
(or "blockhouse") while the vehicle was on the launch pad.

After reviewing these

practices, the team designed first and second-stage simulator algorithms to test and
calibrate the vehicle with blockhouse systems before the vehicle is erected on the pad.
As a result of Phase II improvements, the Delta team was able to move hazardous
and time consuming pressure tests to a separate facility, design a sensor simulation and
calibration system, and ultimately remove three additional days from the overall launch
processing flow cycle.
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Launch

3.3.2.3.3

Phase III Streamlining - Continued Optimization

In their pursuit of reducing the number of workdays on the launch pad to meet
growing customer demand, the Delta team continued to optimize its operational flow. By
the end of Phase IE, all candidate streamlining operations were either moved to the
DMCO or high pressure test facilities. Furthermore, the team incorporated improved
support equipment and started construction of a new launch support facility that
integrated the latest in state-of-the-art mission equipment. The new launch support
facility at Cape Canaveral Air Station was also designed in conjunction with similar
facility upgrades at the Delta site at Vandenberg Air Force Base.
infrastructure was built with efficiency and commonality in mind.

The new launch
The terminals,

commands, and workstations are identical for each site. These common elements help
promote lean operations by maximizing stability in a changing environment such as the
launch business.
Phase III streamlining initiatives also continued to bring incremental value-added
improvements to the launch enterprise flow. After each change to the flow, the Delta
team continued to reevaluate the value stream to identify even more opportunities for
improvement. For example, after determining that first stage leak checks could be run at
pressures that were not deemed hazardous, the team moved the tests back from the pad to
DMCO. Also the installation of Class B ordinances was considered safe enough to move
off-pad to DMCO and the booster processing facility (BPF). (Class B ordinances are
small pyrotechnic devices that initiate launch sequences during flight.

They have

minimal firepower and considered safe enough to install in a populated area.) This

3-29

allowed technicians to place the pyrotechnics in their appropriate locations before the
vehicle is moved to the pad. For example, the first-stage gas generator that spins up the
turbopump at launch is initiated with a small Class B pyrotechnic ignition device. It is
now easier to install this device in the first stage at DMCO before the vehicle is
assembled and shipped to the pad.
Phase III streamlining initiatives allowed the Delta team to continue to optimize
their operations flow and ultimately removed two more days from the launch-processing
schedule. The new on-pad benchmark is 23 workdays instead of the original 40 days
prior to the streamlining initiatives.

3.3.2.3.4

Phase IV Streamlining - Continued Operability Improvements

Delta streamlining is currently in Phase rV. Twenty-three days on-pad time is the
present benchmark with some missions dipping to 21 days.

Phase IV initiatives are

manifested by continuous improvements to launch operations and the constant
reassessment of the launch processing flow.

This lean practice ensures continued

realignment of the value stream that manages flow.

The Delta team is constantly

reviewing the launch process steps and seeing where they can focus new procedures
towards the proper utilization of people and time. One method includes reassessing work
shifts and associated activities. An example is using the second shift of technicians to not
only break down first-shift test equipment and set up tests for the next day, but to also run
short tests in the sequence that night themselves. Another case includes combining tests
and preparation procedures where applicable.

For instance, three successive vehicle

preparation and checkout tests were evaluated for consolidation. The simulated system
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flight test was run twelve days before launch. The engine sequence tests and preparations
were then run the next day. Finally, the first stage RP-1 fuel qualification tests were run
on the third day. The Delta team reviewed the procedures, calculated time and manpower
requirements, and determined it would be feasible to reduce processing by one day by
combining the engine sequence tests with simulated flight and engine preparations for
RP-1 qualifications.
Another example of incremental flow optimization in Phase TV is where the Delta
team revised the procedure for installing the first-stage engine blanket. The blanket is
attached to the engine before launch to thermally protect the vehicle during flight. This
blanket was initially installed on the pad and, as with most custom-fitted cloth devices,
could easily tear or fit improperly upon installation. The Delta team determined they
could move this procedure to DMCO where technicians would have more time to install
the blanket.

The technicians at DMCO then stated that their system tests were

unimpeded by the blanket and it could be installed at the assembly factory in Pueblo,
Colorado. After further evaluation, the Delta team in Pueblo decided that the supplier,
Rocketdyne, should install the blanket at the engine factory itself. Installing the blanket
at Rocketdyne not only streamlined processing procedures, it also eliminated inventory at
the Delta installation facilities, reduced the logistics stream, and allowed technicians at
the launch sites to concentrate on more important tasks. The engine-blanket scenario is a
simple example of the importance of lean thinking.

Analyzing flow, reevaluating

operations sequence, and driving a procedure back to its earliest opportunity shows how
launch operators can optimize procedures and continue ensuring processing capability
and maturation.
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While the previous Phase IV optimization examples may seem too obvious and
logical to mention in a case study, they represent the power of understanding one's
enterprise system.

Such examples can only be obvious if management has a solid

understanding of all the activities in an enterprise and can identify what are the valueadded procedures that increase flow. One may make the analogy that it is only possible
to finely tune a machine that is tuned in the first place.

3.3.2.3.5

Phases I-IV LEM Assessment

While most Delta flow-reduction practices in Phases I through IV are very
launch-system specific, they serve as an example of the steps necessary for a team to start
building a lean operations enterprise. To the Delta team's credit, they were able to
eventually redesign and optimize an operations flow that had been impeded by wasteful
launch procedures for decades. Before it embarked on the seemingly insurmountable
task of process flow optimization, the Delta team understood the importance of the first
step to develop a lean enterprise, identify enterprise flow [32]. Upon further evaluation
of the case study, many of the Delta practices can be directly applied to the Lean
Enterprise Model. Table 4 lists the enabling LEM practices (as depicted in Appendix B)
employed by the Delta team as they identified and optimized the Delta II launch
operations enterprise flow. The table also lists supporting practices and metrics as they
may also be applied to the LEM.
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Table 4

Delta II Flow Identification and Optimization Practices

Enabling Practices
"Establish models and
simulations to permit
understanding of the flow
process"

•

•

"Reduce the number of
flow paths"

•

•

"Strive for single piece
flow"

•

Suggested
Metrics

Suggested
Supporting Practices
Simulate pad
qualification and prelaunch operations

Determine which
launch activities feed
subsequent activities.
Restructure sequence
accordingly to reduce
"backflow"

•

Run pre-launch tests
off pad

•

Drive component
testing to earliest
opportunity possible in
flow

•

Program high-risk
procedures off-pad
and off the process'
critical path

•

Launch Rate

•

Work Days
on Pad

•

Hours per
launch
processing
activity

•

Number of
personnel
required to
complete a
launch
activity

•

Number of on
time launches

•

Schedule slips

•

Increased
launch
availability

•

"Minimize inventory
through all levels of the
value chain"

•

Minimize inventory at
launch site. Drive
back to supplier if
possible, (e.g. The
Delta II's first stage
engine blanket
scenario)

•

Number of
inventory
items on site

•

"Synchronize production
and delivery throughout
the value chain," (or in the
launch operations case,
synchronize launch
activities to the launch
manifest)

•

Configure flow to
meet launch demand

•

Measure takt
time for each
processing
activity
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3.3.3 Delta Post-Production Assembly and Test Philosophy
The previous four-phases of launch operation improvements show how the Delta
team initiated steps in becoming a truly leaner enterprise. It accomplished many of these
activities before concepts of lean thinking were ever established. Nevertheless, the team
realized they had to first focus on the significant tasks of identifying and optimizing the
launch enterprise flow before considering other aspects of launch.

While the four

optimization phases concentrated mainly on one aspect of the Lean Enterprise Model,
they would have not been successful if the Delta team had not considered other lean
principles in the overall launch enterprise. The launch-cycle reduction procedures were
ultimately effective because all stakeholders subscribed to the processes and accepted
changes in their launch routines.

Lean process initiatives are only beneficial if a

corporate culture and its underlying philosophy can embrace, communicate, and delegate
proper authority for change in the management chain. Everyone in the organization must
eventually agree on a standard of practices that drives the corporate culture.

The

following sections highlight the underlying philosophies the Delta team applies in its
launch operations enterprise [34].

3.3.3.1

Maintain a Single Standard of Quality
Boeing's published policy is to maintain a single standard of quality for all

customers at the Pueblo production facility and both launch sites [34]. This standard is
designed to achieve maximum launch success in the most cost-effective manner. One
appropriate example is the use of government quality monitors. Launch providers are
required to pay government monitors at production facilities to inspect the vehicle
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systems that will launch government payloads.

Boeing has chosen to have the

government monitors inspect all launch vehicles and parts regardless of payload
ownership.

Company management feels that the additional costs for inspectors are

hardly noticeable in the bottom-line especially when they feel it's a small price to pay for
a single standard of quality [34]. Cost savings while maintaining a single standard can be
additionally realized in the reduction of logistics stores and associated paperwork.
Maintaining a single quality standard also imparts flexibility in launch vehicle logistics
when, if necessary, vehicles scheduled for government payloads can be substituted with
commercial vehicles.

3.3.3.2

Maximize Continuity and Commonality
Wherever possible, the Delta team attempts to maximize and optimize assembly

and test-flow continuity from the production facilities to the launch sites and within the
launch site processing facilities. This helps to avoid "backflows" in the process flow
stream. An excellent example of this is the incremental process streamlining objectives
discussed in the previous sections that allowed the Delta team to restructure its launch
operations enterprise. Launch operation activities were placed in sequence to maintain a
direct flow while minimizing opportunities for backtracking or rework.
The Delta team also places a high value on maintaining commonality between the
launch sites for all launch vehicles. This provides flexibility of operations for both
government operators and the Delta launch crew, reduces costs of employing and
maintaining separate systems, streamlines training, and maximizes stability in a hightempo environment. For example, Boeing trains their launch teams at both launch sites to
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act as "tiger teams." If necessary, the cross-trained tiger teams can augment each other at
both Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg launch facilities. To ease operations and reduce
confusion, the consoles in each launch control facility are also similar, using common
labels, data displays, and procedures. Even launch site preparation documents (LPDs)
are common down to their methodology of labeling. For instance, the guidance-controlqualifications launch preparation document is labeled F15 ('F' denoting 'Florida' and
'15' denoting days before launch) at Cape Canaveral and VI5 at Vandenberg.

If

procedures are different for each launch site, the changes are plainly marked and
explained in the launch preparation documents.

The Delta team's use of LPDs is

explained in more detail in Section 3.3.3.4.2.

3.3.3.3

Structure and Optimize Test Plan and Procedures
The philosophy of structuring and optimizing the launch test plan has been the

main driver for reducing workdays on the launch pad.

The test plan in pre-launch

processing plays a very significant role in flow operations. If the test plan is optimized
appropriately, then operations flow times are decreased accordingly. To make tests more
efficient, the Delta team pursues the following philosophies.

3.3.3.3.1

Structure Test Plan to Test at First Opportunity

As shown earlier in the engine-blanket scenario, structuring a plan to accomplish
testing at the location where final configuration is first established (factory, off-pad, or
pad) can produce favorable results and minimize unnecessary repetitive testing. Delta
technicians also accomplish post-installation continuity, resistance, and isolation
measurements of flight electrical harnesses at the production facility prior to launch site
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delivery. These and other tests that require tight tolerances have been moved back in the
processing cycle to their initial production locations. Consequently, bad parts can be
removed early in the assembly line before additional components are added, welded, or
permanently affixed on the vehicle.

Identifying bad parts early also allows technicians

familiar with the part to troubleshoot the problem and contact the supplier to discuss
ways that avoid failures in the future.
Another example of structuring the launch test plan includes running leak tests on
all fluid connections immediately after assembly. The pad is the worst place to run these
tests and certainly a poor location for technicians to be creative if a failure occurs.
Subsystem tests on the pad may require disassembly of a flight ready vehicle and
potentially risk compromising other systems. If such tests fail, complicated repairs can
even cause more damage to the vehicle and may ultimately delay the launch date. Again,
designing a test plan to reduce final testing at the pad requires detailed knowledge of the
overall launch operations flow.
Additionally, structuring the test plan early also allows the launch team to verify
mission specific modifications, including software changes, prior to delivery to the
launch pad. This flexibility is important since no two missions are alike. Payloads may
be dissimilar, and the Delta II rocket itself comes in varieties of 2-stage, 3-stage, and may
include three, four, or nine strap-on solid rocket motors. Waiting until the pad to see how
a particular vehicle configuration will affect the launch did not make sense in the past,
and it certainly does not make sense in today's lean launch enterprise.
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3.3.3.3.2

Deliver Hardware to the Pad at Highest Level of Integration

Today's ELV stages and payloads are still assembled on the pad. The current
infrastructure is not designed to erect a vehicle and its payload on the launch pad in a
similar fashion as the Russian Proton. Future EELV stages will be assembled and tested
off-pad, moved to the launch pad by a transporter-erector, and erected as one ready-tolaunch vehicle.

In the meantime, the Delta launch team is ensuring the Delta II is

delivered to the pad at the highest level of integration practical. The vehicle is still fully
assembled (minus payload) in DMCO to verify electrical connections.

It is then

subjected to a generic flight-test program to verify the flight systems. The systems are
then disconnected and the stages brought to the pad.

The purpose of verifying the

systems at DMCO is to prevent them from being connected for the first time at the launch
pad.
Once on the launch pad, a flight systems end-to-end test is run to check the flight
performance of the fully integrated vehicle including the payload, flight, and ground
software. Unlike the flight test program at DMCO that used generic flight parameters,
the second test on the pad is tuned with algorithms rewritten to demonstrate the complete
mission with actual flight values.

This gives the Delta team full confidence of the

upcoming launch and allows them to correct any anomalies they may encounter.

3.3.3.3.3

Plan for Contingencies Within Flow

In addition to optimizing the launch operations flow, the Delta team has generated
a risk management strategy that realistically plans for contingencies and considers time
factors and breaches in systems integrity during test sequences.
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Under the LEM

overarching practice, implement Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD),
an associated enabling practice is for the operator to define risk management [32].
Defining risk management for some may be as difficult as defining value. As with the
definition of value, it is the process stakeholders who must classify their view of risk
management and determine how it directly applies to their operations. Some companies
may require complete risk avoidance rather than accepting a small amount of risk within
the enterprise environment.

Many who understand the technical nature of the launch

business would state that risk avoidance is practically impossible. However, it is the
launch provider's responsibility to determine its level of risk acceptance in the launch
process and isolate the systems or activities that may result in contingencies. If it is
technically infeasible or prohibitively expensive to fully eliminate those contingencies,
the launch providers must build plans and procedures to ensure that a launch vehicle will
be fully operational within the shortest amount of time. The Delta team maintains such
procedures in a library of contingency documents that cover examples from changing out
defective black boxes to replacing hydraulic actuators. As with optimizing an operations
flow, preparing for contingencies also requires a strong understanding of the launch
enterprise and all related factors.
It is interesting to note the philosophy the Delta team has with planning
contingency time. While other launch providers may schedule in a 10% -25% cushion
for unforeseen events, the Delta team instead schedules their launch processing to
account for full use of resources and protects itself by a system that is designed to rely on
minimal dependencies. Basically, instead of planning contingency time, the team builds
contingency plans through good risk management and a flexible flow structure. If extra
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time is required, the team will increase the operational tempo to meet demand, but it
never initially plans for takt times that may be easily expanded to fill an inflated launch
schedule.

3.3.3.3.4

Employ Proper Data Management Principles

The Delta team's philosophy is to maintain a lean database of data collected
during launch processing. Specifically, technicians and engineers only collect data that
they plan to ultimately review and use. Optimizing the data flow also ensures a seamless
information stream that guarantees all launch operators have access to organized,
available, and traceable data.

3.3.3.4 Additional Practices
The previous sections highlight the overarching philosophies the Delta team
employs to continuously improve their launch operations enterprise. Many of Delta II
improvements have been in place before Boeing or McDonnell Douglas heard of the
Lean Aerospace Initiative. Still, the improvements show that a company committed to
quality and its customers can implement business practices that ultimately manifest
themselves as lean practices. In addition to the published philosophies and practices in
the previous sections, there are additional lean-enabling trends within the Delta team's
corporate culture.

3.3.3.4.1

Promote Lean Leadership

The Delta team promotes lean leadership at all levels. Every stakeholder on the
team from the launch site manager to the technicians on the pad is involved in achieving
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an optimized launch operations enterprise.

Each morning the launch team, payload

customer, and their Air Force partners have a "stand-up" meeting where launch status is
communicated to every member on the team. Sessions are video teleconferenced to the
pad, blockhouse, and operations center. These meetings are very thorough and every
team member has an opportunity to report on progress, conflicts, and overall status. This
system helps ensure consistency and focuses on the launch plan while involving every
stakeholder in the process.

3.3.3.4.2

Launch Preparation Documentation

The Delta team has also built a system that assures seamless information flow to
all technicians responsible for launch processing. This system is manifested in daily test
procedures called launch preparation documents (LPDs). The revolutionary LPD system
was created by Boeing to effectively streamline the Delta's processing documentation.
While LPDs may not seem exceedingly remarkable to aircraft maintainers who are
accustomed to a flight-line's Technical Orders (TOs), it is important to note that launch
operations are very different than aircraft operations.

Both the aircraft and space

industries are diverse and it is sometimes difficult to draw parallels between the two.
Building a system of "technical orders" for launch vehicles is an example of looking to
other enterprises for smart ways to optimize one's own process. As with aircraft TOs, the
Delta launch preparation documents standardize system configuration control while
communicating a single standard of procedures that an appropriately trained operator can
employ.

Each stand-alone LPD includes any blueprints, procedures, and checklists
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necessary to complete a given day's task. A cover of a sample LPD is depicted in
Figure 14.

LPD

02-F1S-R19

D«t«_
This Is a CODE 2 release
for the
mission.
Last CODE 3 released for
mission
Changes Do Not Affect
The Hazard Level

Launch
Preparation

GUIDANCE CONTROL
QUALIFICATIONS

Document for

A

THIS LPD DOES NOT CONTAIN
HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS

Mission:
S/N:

Modal:

PAD 17B

Location:

Figure 14 Example Delta II Launch Preparation Document

Even the LPD cover helps reduce confusion and communicates the document's
objective. The document in Figure 14 is labeled "D2-F15-R19." This states that the
LPD's guidance and control qualification procedures are for the Delta II, intended to be
performed fifteen days before launch at the Florida (hence the 'F' designator) site, and
that the document is in its nineteenth revision. The cover of the LPD is also color-coded
orange for commercial payloads or blue for government payloads.

Each LPD is

essentially a checklist of procedures to help make complicated launch processing
instructions easy to follow. To maximize data traceability and accountability, a LPD is
signed off upon completion by the test conductor, assistant test conductor, and
responsible engineer. The documents also provide a common and consistent means to
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record progress and metrics for a given task. These metrics can then be gathered and
used within statistical sets to determine efficiency, resource utilization, or flow time.
Ultimately they can be used as tools and indicators for continued flow optimization.
Managers also challenge each stakeholder to improve the launch process through
the LPD system. At the end of each LPD is a detailed recommendation sheet. Every
technician is encouraged to write suggestions that can improve their procedures. These
recommendations may then be incorporated in the next mission's documentation.
Stakeholders are also encouraged to author LPDs that are completely new or consolidate
a set of LPD activities. The Delta team has published a "Friendly Writers Guide to
LPDs" that ensures commonality and consistency between new LPDs while walking the
writer through the documentation process [34].
The LPD system maximizes flow visibility and streamlines a complicated and
technical process. It also allows management to baseline their training program around a
common set of procedures and optimize allocation and utilization of people. The inventor
of the LPD process probably did not realize his revolutionary system represented lean
principles in so many ways.

3.3.3.4.3

Government-Contractor Interaction

Interaction between Boeing and its Air Force partner, the First Space Launch
Squadron (1SLS), has become a key element for launch success. The teams work handin-hand to ensure maximum use of space assets. Each team appears to trust one another
and lacks the tension many government organizations and their contractors seem to
endure. This display of trust is an important factor to cultivate in today's shrinking
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defense force, and is especially important now that acquisition reform initiatives are
requiring less oversight from the government. Air Force Space Command is in the
process of transitioning from an oversight role to an "insight" role where the government
is attempting more of a hands-off approach to launch management [19]. General Robert
C. Hinson, Director of Operations for Air Force Space Command states, "We are now
concentrating on gaining insight with our launch contractors rather than providing
oversight." Commenting on the need to optimize military manpower levels at the launch
squadrons, he remarks, "We have blue-suit maintenance people who never touch a
wrench, operators who never touch a booster. In a time of declining manpower we feel
this is not the most efficient use of our highly trained people. [19]" Before transitioning
to a new insight role, it will be important that launch providers show they are committed
to their customers and build launch enterprises that ensure efficient access to space. It
will be the government's responsibility to properly evaluate such enterprises and reward
the providers who successfully meet mission assurance requirements, reduce costs, and
deliver payloads with maximum success.

3.3.3.5 Delta Launch Operations and Test Philosophy - LEM Assessment
Within the Delta II team's post-production assembly and test philosophy are
combinations of Lean Enterprise Model overarching and enabling practices. To illustrate
results of the case study, tables in this section summarize enabling LEM practices as they
apply to the Delta II team's operation procedures and organizational culture. Each table
also lists supporting practices and metrics as they may be applied to the LEM.

3-44

Table 5 concentrates on the LEM practice of ensuring process capability and
maturation. While it appears this practice was originally drafted by the LAI consortium
to be applied in design and manufacturing processes, it is also well suited for system
operations. The table also lists applicable Delta II lean practices as they can be applied to
the existing LEM enabling practice of ensuring process capability and maturation, and
recommends additional enabling and supporting practices as they may be applied to
launch operations.
Perhaps two of the most important aspects in the Delta launch team philosophy
are communications and information flow. For highly technical processes such as launch
operations to be successful enterprises, seamless information flow is required among all
stakeholders whether they are the process technicians, operations management, the
launch operators themselves, customers, or hardware suppliers. Table 6 describes how
the Delta II launch process may be applied to the LEM enabling practice of assuring
seamless information flow among all stakeholders in the launch enterprise. It also lists
recommended supporting practices and metrics that may be applied to operation
enterprises.
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Table 5

Delta II Flow Process Capability and Maturation Practices
Suggested Supporting
Practices

Enabling Practices
•

•

•

Suggested Metrics

Structure operations test
plans and procedures to
avoid "backflow" in
launch processing (i.e.
test the right part at the
right time.)

•

Number of re-tests

•

Number of flight-ready
parts compromised by
testing procedures or
failed tests

•

Deliver launch hardware
to the pad at the highest
level of integration

•

Number of electrical
connections that need
re-testing on pad after
complete vehicle
assembly

Suggested
Practice: Maintain
a single standard of
quality (Single
Process Initiative)

•

Optimize use of
government or company
quality inspectors

•

Number of system
inspectors within process
flow

•

Avoid flight systems
being classified as either
"commercial" or
"government." Apply
same level of quality
assurance

•

Number of system or
sub-system failures

Suggested
Practice:
Maximize
continuity and
commonality of
operations

•

Build common mission
support, range, and
operation systems
regardless of launch site

•

•

Design identical launch
processing procedures
regardless of site

Number of unique range
items, procedures, or
infrastructure items that
require modifications to
a common operations
plan

•

Number of documented
differences in processing
or operations procedures
for each site

•

Increased launch rate

"Define and
control processes
throughout the
value chain" LEM

(Note: may also be
applied to LEM
overarching practice,
"Optimize Capability
and Utilization of
People")

•

•

Build a generic training
plan that provides
flexibility in the training
of operators that covers
all operations sites
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Table 6

Delta II Information Flow Practices
Suggested Supporting
Practices

LEM Enabling
Practices
•

•

"Make processes &
flows visible to all
stakeholders"

"Establish open
and timely
communications"

•

Combine and document launch
process activities in standard
configuration control system
[such as the launch preparation
documents (LPDs)]

•

Provide training for creation of
improved documentation as
flow process is optimized and
activities changed or combined

•

•

Maintain open communications
with launch hardware suppliers.
Continuously communicate
ways to optimize flow (e.g. the
Delta 11 first stage engine
blanket scenario)
Initiate launch status "stand-up"
meetings to include all launch
stakeholders
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Suggested Metrics
•

Amount of
documentation per set of
activities (ex: (1) LPD
for each workday)

•

Number of launch
processing activities
consolidated per
document

•

Number of contingency
plans integrated
documentation

•

Percent commonality
among documentation

•

Document information
retrieval time

•

Number of comments
generated by launch
technicians that suggest
process improvements

•

Percent of stakeholders
involved in
communications (goal:
100%)

•

Number of stakeholders
required to report at
predetermined intervals
within flow process

Table 6

Delta II Information Flow Practices, Continued
Suggested Supporting
Practices

LEM Enabling
Practices
•

"Minimize
documentation
while ensuring
necessary data
traceability and
availability"

•

•

Generate data system to require
user inputs that facilitate
gathering essential flow
statistics and related metrics
(e.g. LPD fields that require
measurement inputs of flow
time, resource utilization, etc)

Suggested Metrics
•

Percent of
documentation signedoff at the end of each
activity series

•

Percent of data inputted
in documentation that is
used for later analyses

Assure process ownership and
accountability within
documentation (e.g. require
technicians to sign off on tasks
at the end of each activity)

Based on the preceding analyses of the Delta II launch operations process and its
relation to the LEM, it is rather easy to see which lean principles are significant drivers in
the Delta II launch operations philosophy.

Furthermore, additional Lean Enterprise

Model practices stand out in the Delta II team's launch operations. Table 7 combines
several of these results and lists recommended supporting practices and metrics where
applicable to the LEM.
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Table 7

Additional Lean Practices in the Delta II Launch Enterprise
LEM Enabling
Practices

LEM
Overarching
Practices
•

•

•

•

"Continuously
Focus on the
Customer"

"Promote
Lean
Leadership at
all Levels"

"Develop
relationships
based on
mutual trust
and
commitment"

"Maintain
challenge of
existing
processes"

Initiate regular status
meetings with all
launch stakeholders,
including payload
customer

•

Positive
performance
survey results

•

Performance
evaluation on
award fee
determinations

•

Build lean practices
into operations
activities, document
required procedures in
operational checklists

•

Develop lean
metrics at all
levels

•

Build in accountability
into process. Require
applicable stakeholders
to sign off activities in
launch documentation

•

Include suppliers in
optimizing lean
operations flow

•

Level of mission
readiness at
launch site

•

Build a teaming
relationship with local
Air Force launch
squadrons

•

Positive
performance
survey results

•

•

Focus and document
shared mission of
providing costeffective, safe, reliable,
and flexible access to
space

Performance
evaluation on
award fee
determinations

•

Optimize data flow

•

•

Collect only launch
data planned for later
review and use

Percentage of
data collected
that is ultimately
used

"Provide for
continuous
information flow and
feedback with
stakeholders"

•

•

"Flow-down lean
principles, practices,
and metrics to all
organizational levels"

•

Instill individual
ownership at all
levels

•

•

•

•

"Build stable and
cooperative
relationships
internally and
externally"
"Provide for mutual
sharing of benefits
from implementation
of lean practices"

"Establish structured
processes for
generating,
evaluating, and
implementing
improvements at all
levels"

Suggested
Metrics

Suggested Supporting
Practices
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4

Future Lean Initiatives

While the previous sections describe how lean principles are being applied to
current launch operations enterprises, this chapter provides a brief survey of future
programs that are intended to make Air Force launch operations "better, cheaper, and
faster." To the degree each program takes advantage of lean principles will depend on
system designers and ultimate operators.

4.1 EELV
In addition to improving existing launch operations, two U.S. launch providers are
ramping up production for the next generation of evolved expendable launch vehicles
(EELV). The EELV program is designed to reduce current launch costs by at least 25%,
with an objective of 50%. Table 8 lists cost and other Air Force EELV requirements.
In December 1996, the Air Force awarded initial launch service contracts to
Lockheed Martin and Boeing for development of the EELV.

After the two EELV

concepts were presented, the Air Force announced contract awards on October 16, 1998.
It awarded Boeing a procurement contract of 19 Delta IV EELV launches valued at
approximately $1.38 billion [36].

To maintain its dual EELV acquisition contract

strategy, the Air Force also awarded a contract to Lockheed valued at approximately
$1.15 billion to complete development of its EELV and to provide launch services for
nine missions between the years 2003 and 2005 [35].
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Table 8
[

EELV Requirements Matrix [4:23]
Threshold

Objective

17,000 lbm (7,711 kg)

+15%

Mass To Polar Orbit 1

4,400- 7,000 lbm
(1,996-3,175 kg)

+15%

Mass To Polar Orbit 2

41,000 lbm (18,597 kg)

+5%

Mass To SemiSynchronous Obit

2,500 - 4,725 lbm
(1,134-2,143 kg)

+15%

Mass To GTO

6,100-8,500 lbm
(2,767 - 3,855 kg)

+15%

Mass To Molniya Orbit

7,000 lbra (3,175 kg)

+15%

Mass To GEO

13,500 lbm (6,123 kg)

+5%

Vehicle design
reliability

98%

>98%

Able to launch all
configurations

Same

Standard payload interface
for each vehicle class

One standard payload
interface

Cost Savings:
Reduction over current
systems

25%

50%

Timeliness: Probability
of launch within 10
days

80%

90%

45 Days (Medium EELV)

30 Days (Medium EELV)

90 Days (Heavy EELV)

60 Days (Heavy EELV)

14

26

Requirement
Mass To LEO

Standard launch pads
Standard payload
interface

Responsiveness:

Launch Rate: During
12 month period

While Boeing and Lockheed Martin EELVs share the common goal of reducing
existing launch costs by 25% to 50% and meeting future responsiveness requirements,
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both vehicles differ slightly in their technological designs. For example, the Boeing
EELV will be powered by a new Rocketdyne propulsion system, the RS-68 liquid
oxygen/hydrogen fueled rocket engine.

The RS-68 will generate approximately

650.000 lbf (2,891,340 N) of thrust at lift-off and will be the most powerful liquid
oxygen/hydrogen rocket engine in the world [6]. The driving force behind the new lean
RS-68 design was to use three-dimensional modeling tools to reduce engine parts count,
thereby reducing engine costs [39]. The Lockheed EELV main propulsion system is
based on a re-engineered version of a liquid oxygen/kerosene rocket engine originally
developed in Russia and is similar to the one used on the Proton launch vehicle.

This

engine, the RD-180, is part of a common core booster that will be first flight-tested on
Atlas III launch vehicles. One interesting technological note is that the RD-180 is the
world's first expendable liquid-propellant engine that can be throttled, thereby providing
increased flexibility in planning launch profiles [38]. Regardless of the technologies used
in the two competing EELV designs, both EELV contractors are planning to implement
leaner practices in their production and operations.

The following sections briefly

highlight the practices Lockheed Martin and Boeing will use in their EELV launch
operation enterprises.

4.1.1

Lockheed Martin EELV Operations Plan
Unlike the current Atlas II family of expendable launch vehicles, all major launch

processing operations of Lockheed Martin's EELV will be completed off-pad. Lockheed
planners are working towards a "clean pad" concept of operations that should drive
EELV delivery-to-launch cycles down to approximately 21 days (with only one day on

4-3

the pad), increase launch rates by 50%, reduce launch costs 25 to 50%, and require 33%
less people for launch processing operations [28].

Lockheed's clean-pad concept is

similar to the Russian Proton processing practices in many ways. For example, the
concept allows payloads to be processed in "offline-encapsulation" facilities (instead of
the pad) and mated to EELV boosters in another separate processing facility. The entire
system will then be transported to the pad as a single ready-to-launch unit [38]. With
optimistic scheduling a vehicle could be rolled out to the pad 24 hours before launch,
with on-pad fueling consuming only one 8-hour shift [38].
In an attempt to drive all system checkouts as far back as possible in the
operations flow, major system verification tests will be completed at Lockheed's Denver,
Colorado manufacturing facility.

In an attempt to optimize overall flow for both

payloads and launch vehicles, Lockheed plans to synchronize production and delivery
throughout the company's value chain.

Since Lockheed produces many of today's

satellite payloads, it plans to synchronize future delivery of rocket boosters with their
payloads. As a result, the company intends to cut overall cycle times between sale and
delivery of complete systems. Nathan J. Lindsay, Lockheed Martin vice president and
EELV program manager, told Aviation Week, "It doesn't make much sense to have an
18-month satellite cycle time and a 24-month rocket cycle time" [38]. He also states the
company has implemented an Integrated Product Team (IPT) management structure at
the factory to bolster systems engineering capabilities that can further reduce
manufacturing cycle times [38].
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4.1.2

Boeing Delta IV/EELV Operations Plan
The Boeing Company's EELV design concept was to start clean and develop

manufacturing, processing, and launch facilities with lean practices in mind from the
beginning of conceptual design. Boeing has built a dedicated EELV manufacturing
facility in Decatur, Alabama, which provides water access for the transportation of its
new boosters to both Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg launch sites. The Decatur plant
was designed from the ground up to use a new lean manufacturing system and is directed
by a "lean manager" [5]. To continue practices first learned with the Delta II launch
processing system, Boeing plans to push more integrated checkout procedures of major
EELV subsystems to the Decatur plant [39]. Once at the launch site, Boeing will process
the vehicle horizontally instead of traditional vertical stacking practices. This will save
on new building costs and should result in safer processing operations [39]. Boeing plans
to process as many as three launch vehicles at a time and will roll each mated EELV first
and second stages to the pad and erect them vertically. The payload, its fairing, and
booster adapter will already be checked out when they are hoisted to the bottom two
stages on the pad. Boeing estimates that major components could arrive at the launch site
within 30 days of launch. Once at the site, on-pad time for the first and second stages
should last approximately six days [39].

4.2 Range Standardization and Automation (RSA)
While U.S. launch sites are preparing to host new EELV systems, the Air Force
will also be implementing its Range Standardization and Automation (RSA) program.
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The RSA program is designed to address and rectify two main launch deficiencies. The
first is unresponsive spacelift and the second is costly, inflexible launch ranges.

The

RSA program consists of major upgrades to aging range operation systems and tracking
equipment and is designed to improve range reliability, availability, maintainability, and
operability. Through these upgrades, the Air Force is expecting to significantly reduce
operations and maintenance costs. The following activities are planned during the RSA
program:
•

Consolidate instrumentation using unified tracking antennas at remote
tracking sites.

This will consolidate metric, telemetry, and command

functions at both the ETR and WTR remote tracking sites.
•

Upgrade the Cape Canaveral communications backbone with a fiber optics
network to allow redundant communications capabilities, increased data rate
and bandwidth, and increased communications reliability.

•

Build a Centralized Telemetry Processing System (CTPS) for both ranges, and
upgrade the Range Operations Control Centers (ROCC) at the Eastern and
Western Ranges.

•

Upgrade imaging, surveillance, and weather systems.

•

Upgrade debris tracking systems and the multiple objects tracking radar
(MOTR) [44:25].
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In addition to reducing operations costs and increasing range reliability,
availability, and maintainability, the RSA program is designed to provide the following
benefits to the Air Force:
•

Reduce range reconfiguration times from days to hours

•

Standardize range architecture, operations, and logistics support

•

Eliminate the need for in-house depot maintenance and fabrication

•

Eliminate over 25,000 obsolete range components [44:26]

The Air Force is depending on the RSA program to reduce the complexity and
costs of current launch operations. The combination of new expendable launch vehicles
and leaner launch infrastructures should allow the United States to maintain its space
superiority in the next century. The success of these future systems depends on efficient
designs and new, leaner operations.
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5

Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Overview
This thesis describes how lean thinking can be applied to expendable launch
vehicle operations. Given the existing launch infrastructure, launch providers have started
to turn inefficient processes into leaner enterprises.

Many of these practices can be

applied to other expendable launch operations and provide a strong system-level baseline
for the next generation of launch vehicles such as the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV). Using the Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) as a guide, launch practices
are reviewed to determine lean activities in launch processing cycles. This thesis focuses
on the following:
•

The Lean Aerospace Initiative (LAI) and the concepts of lean thinking

•

A review of current and future launch system requirements and their
opportunities for lean practices.

•

Analysis of current expendable launch procedures and identification of truly
lean, value-added steps in their operations.

•

A case study investigating current expendable launch processing operations.

•

Results that show how lean principles have helped current launch teams build
leaner launch operation enterprises.
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5.2 Conclusions
The Lean Enterprise Model adapts well to launch operations. As with any other
lean endeavor, the following LEM enterprise principles are applicable to launch
operations:
a) Be responsive to change
b) Minimize waste
c) Do the right thing at the right place, time, and quantity
d) Build effective relationships within the value stream
e) Strive for continuous improvement
There are ample opportunities for lean research with respect to medium-lift
expendable launch operations. An Aerospace Corporation study states that current U.S.
medium expendable launch vehicles (Atlas and Delta class) can deliver an approximate
maximum of 29 flights per year [2:60]. The study also forecasts a demand of 30 to 64
medium expendable launches per year in the 2000 to 2010 time frame.

Including

medium-class EELV and Sea Launch estimates during the same time frame, the
forecasted flight rate for U.S. systems is approximately 58 launches per year. To meet
such unprecedented demand, launch providers need to build operations enterprises that
are better and faster than current practices. In addition to meeting anticipated launch
demands, future vehicles are expected to be more responsive to space mission needs and
reduce current launch costs by 25 to 50%.

5-2

Where to apply lean principles to launch operations is the question. The first of
twelve overarching practices listed in the LAI Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) is identify
and optimize flow. This entails "optimizing the flow of products and services, either
affecting or within the process, from concept design through point of use." [32] Launch
operation providers can use this practice to analyze launch activity, assess impact on
other activities, and determine which activities are necessary, of limited value, or nonvalue added.
A significant portion of this thesis investigates the launch processing operations
of Boeing's medium-lift expendable launch vehicle, the Delta II, at Cape Canaveral Air
Station (CCAS), Florida.

The Delta team knew the importance of identifying and

optimizing enterprise flow, and established a thorough understanding of their launch
operations in the process. Identifying the launch flow required them to step back and
look at their launch procedures as a complete system of interrelated activities and key in
on the activities that slowed the flow. This sounds like a rather simple step, but is often
overlooked by many organizations in the process of sub-optimizing activities. Once the
enterprise flow is identified, only then can it be optimized.

When the Delta team

identified their flow, they were able to optimize launch-processing activities by:
•

Simulating pad qualification and pre-launch activities

•

Determining which launch activities impacted others, and were able to
restructure sequence accordingly to avoid "backflow"

•

Run most booster pre-launch tests off-pad by driving component testing to
earliest opportunity in flow
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•

Program high-risk procedures off-pad and off the process' critical path

•

Better configure flow to meet launch demand

Once an organization has a strong understanding of it enterprise flow, it can then
start concentrating on the other lean practices.

For instance, after the Delta team

identified all their launch activities, it was able to start working on process capability and
maturation.

Maturation practices in the launch flow involved restructuring launch

process activities and optimizing test and evaluation procedures. The Delta case study
results in Chapter 3 also point out additional LEM practices that can be applied to launch
processing activities including:
•

Assure seamless information flow

•

Continuously focus on the customer

•

Promote lean leadership at all levels

•

Develop relationships based on mutual trust and commitment

•

Maintain challenge of existing processes

By applying lean principles to the launch processing activities, the Delta II launch
team has drastically reduced on-pad time, from 40 to 23 work days, restructured its
testing philosophy, and streamlined its operations flow. As a result, Boeing is able to
offer more competitive launch services to their government and commercial customers.
Many of the lessons learned from Delta II process optimization provide a strong
foundation for operations of the next generation of launch vehicles such as the EELV.
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5.3 Recommendations
Resulting from the Delta II case study are recommended practices that may be
incorporated into the Lean Enterprise Model. While the suggested practices are mostly
based on the launch operation research gathered in this thesis, they have broad
applications to other space operation enterprises. The following list includes specific
recommendations and highlights suggested areas of interest for further research.

5.3.1

List of Recommendations
The Lean Enterprise Model's twelve overarching practices and related enabling

practices are broadly applicable to launch operations. Furthermore, many of the practices
used to improve launch operation flows can be applied to the LEM as supporting
practices. This author recommends implementing these supporting practices to the LEM
database as listed in the tables at the end of Chapter 3 (Reference Tables 4 - 7).
This author also recommends continued lean-based research in launch operations.
Further research opportunities exist in the Delta II launch enterprise. As the Delta II team
moved operations off the initial process' critical path and away from the launch pad, it
built a shorter critical path to include new off-pad activities. It would be worthwhile to
analyze these activities and determine which ones constitute the new critical path, apply
to other launch operation enterprises, and are indeed as lean as possible.
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While this thesis covers only one aspect of expendable launch operations, it
provides a foundation for continued study. Additional areas for research in space launch
operations include:
•

Current small-lift expendable launch operations involving Orbital Science
Corporation's Pegasus and Taurus-class of launch vehicles.

•

Other current medium-lift operations to include vehicles in the Lockheed Atlas II
family. It would be interesting to compare Atlas II launch operations to the Delta
II processes studied in this thesis. It may also be worthwhile to investigate both
Atlas and Delta's overseas competition, the European Space Agency's Ariane 4
launch vehicle.

The Ariane 4 is known for its innovative launch-processing

methods and is considered a strong competitor to U.S. launch providers [27].
•

Current heavy-lift expendable launch operations including Titan IV operations.

•

Current reusable launch operations involving the Space Shuttle. It would be useful
to see what lean practices the United Space Alliance has implemented with the
Space Shuttle and determine if they are relevant to proposed future reusable launch
vehicle (RLV) operations.

•

Future medium and heavy EELV operations. Obviously now is the best time to
make sure these important systems come online in the leanest possible ways.
An

additional

recommendation

includes

Standardization and Automation (RSA) program.

an

evaluation

of

the

Range

It would be beneficial to both

development contractors and Air Force operators to learn where lean principles could be
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applied to the crucial launch-infrastructure upgrade program. The RSA program is very
broad and it will be necessary to scope research appropriately.

Areas of RSA lean

operations research may include training, communications, safety, security, hardware
development, and operations support procedures.

5.3.2

Policy Recommendations
On a final note, the launch business is at an exciting turning point. Since launch

manifests are becoming more populated with commercial launches, the government must
realize that it is in the contractor's best interest to provide leaner, reliable, and costeffective launches.

Today's launch system reliability cannot be measured by the

adherence to military specifications.

As launch companies start providing more

sophisticated launch operations that emphasize full efficiency and utilization of lean
practices, military process requirements will become less applicable.
Government launch operators should let the contractors forge their own lean paths
and learn to be flexible in interfacing with the new, lean principles. The Air Force ought
to apply appropriate actions to show launch providers that value-added "insight" will be
applied where applicable and wasteful "oversight" removed when unnecessary.

It may

be appropriate for launch operators and Air Force sponsors to align their thinking to
follow that of Brigadier General Robert Hinson, AFSPC/DO, when he states:
All we want is insight to the process that says: 'You, Mr./Ms. Contractor, have
done everything you claimed to do for us to have a successful mission. You have
taken into consideration and provided safety, security, and infrastructure
protection, so collectively we can have a successful launch.' [Air Force Space
Command] will continue to demand a focus on safety, security, and resource
protection regardless of the type of system being launched. [19]
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A recommended way to provide lean "insight" is to design launch service
contracts that focus on the ultimate deliverable item; provide cost-effective, on time, and
reliable launches.

Officials who draft launch contracts should design them to ensure

launch success, but ought to think twice before requiring progress or cost reports that
increase launch workload, add little value, and detract from the ultimate launch goal. It
will be interesting to see how much insight Air Force Space Command is willing to live
with during future launch operations. NASA has transitioned much of its Space Shuttle
operations to United Space Alliance. It may be a worthwhile endeavor for an AFIT
Space Operations student to compare the NASA example to similar Air Force plans.
This research could focus on investigating the historical significance and policy
implications of transitioning military launch services to the commercial sector.

5.4 Final Remarks
This thesis attempts to portray the importance of lean implementation in current
launch operations. While promising practices are being applied to launch activities,
current operations are far from completely lean enterprises. Nevertheless, both launch
providers and their customers have a vested interest in continually improving spacelift
operations. It is exciting to see the Lean Aerospace Initiative strongly influence the
design and operations of the next generation of expendable launch vehicles. Perhaps
completely lean launch enterprises are not far in sight.
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The concept of lean thinking is more than a set of buzzwords. In the era of
limited aerospace funding, lean thinking has become a necessity. Lean space operations
can and must be performed for the United States to remain competitive in a global space
market and for its Air and Space Force to maintain its superiority in the next millennium.
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Appendix A: LAI Member Organizations
(as of Jan 1999)

Principle Investigators and Researchers
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Air Force Institute of Technology

Avionics/Missiles
Applied Materials Inc.
Hewlett Packard
Lockheed Martin Electronics & Missiles
Raytheon Systems Co.
Textron Systems Division
TRW Inc.

Space
Boeing Space Transportation
Gencorp Aerojet Systems
Hughes Space & Communications
Lockheed Martin Space and Strategic Missiles
Pratt & Whitney Space Propulsion
TRW Inc.

Propulsion
Allison Engine Company
General Electric Aircraft Engines
Pratt & Whitney Gov't Engines
Sundstrand Corp.
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Airframe
Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Sector
Northrop Grumman Corp.
Raytheon Aircraft Co.
The Boeing Company (St. Louis, Seattle)

Government
AFRL (Materials and Manufacturing Directorate)
Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM)
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
Deputy of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
(DUSD/A&T)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC)
SPOs: JSF, F-22, C-17, Training (JPATS)
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Appendix B: The Lean Enterprise Model

A-3

Lean Aerospace -^<
Initiative
"

The Lean Enterprise l\
The Lean Enterprise Model (LEM) is a systematic framework for organizing and disseminating research results of the Lean At
encompasses lean enterprise principles and practices and is populated by research-based benchmarking data derived from s
and other research activities. The LEM is designed to help LAI members identify and assess the leanness of their own organize
and is intended to help leverage opportunities for organizational change and to support future lean efforts.

B

IDENTIFY AND OPTIMIZE
ENTERPRISE FLOW

"Optimize the flow of products and services,
either affecting or within the process, from
concept design through point of use."
METRICS

\E

ASSURE
SEAMLESS
INFORMATION FLOW

"Provide processes for
seamless and timely transfer of
and access to pertinent
information."

0 Flow Efficiency = actual work time
total flow time
£ # Throughput
A % Order to point of use delivery cycle time
0 Total PD cycle time, concept to launch
ENABLING PRACTICES
Establish models
and/or simulations
to permit
understanding and
evaluation of the
flow process
(1,2,4,5,9,11)
Reduce the number
of flow paths
(1,4,5,9)
Minimize inventory
through all tiers of
the value chain
(1,2,4,9,11,12)
Reduce setup times
(1,9)
Implement process
owner inspection
throughout the
value chain
(1,2,3,4,6,9,11)
Strive for single
piece flow (1,2,9,12)

Minimize space
utilized and
distance traveled
by personnel and
material
(1,2,3,5,6,7,12)
Synchronize
production and
delivery throughout
the value chain
(1,2,6,9,12)
Maintain equipment
to minimize
unplanned
stoppages
(1,2,3,4,11)

The Lean Enterprise Model • Summary Chart With Enabling Practices
July 1998

0

METRICS
$ Commonality of
databases
0 Information retrieval
time
£ Information sharing
between customers &
suppliers
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Make processes and
flows visible to all
stakeholders
(1,2,4,5,9,11)
• Establish open and
timely
communications,
among all
stakeholders
(1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,12)
• Link databases for
key functions
throughout the value
chain (1,2,4,5,9,12)
• Minimize
documentation while
ensuring necessary
data traceability and
availability
(1,2,4,5,9,11)

(U

OPTIMIZE
CAPABILITY AND
UTILIZATION
OF PEOPLE

"Assure properly trained
people are available when
needed."
METRICS
3fc Training hours /
employee
$ Output / employee
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Establish career and
skill development
programs for each
employee (3,6,10)
• Ensure maintenance,
certification and
upgrading of critical
skills (2,3,4,10,11)
• Analyze workforce
capabilities and
needs to provide for
balance of breadth
and depth of
skills/knowledge
(1,3,5,8,10,11)
• Broaden jobs to
facilitate the
development of a
flexible workforce
(1,3,4,5,10,12)

Re

»rise Model
:h results of the Lean Aerospace Initiative.

Right Thir
E

It

king data derived from surveys, case studies,

ENTE

ass of their own organizations and processes,
orts.

OPTIMIZE
APABILITY AND
UTILIZATION
OF PEOPLE
ssure properly trained
jp/e are available when
needed."
METRICS
Training hours /
employee
Output / employee
1ABLING PRACTICES
Establish career and
skill development
programs for each
employee (3,6,10)
Ensure maintenance,
certification and
upgrading of critical
skills (2,3,4,10,11)
Analyze workforce
capabilities and
needs to provide for
balance of breadth
and depth of
skills/knowledge
(1,3,5,8,10,11)
Broaden jobs to
facilitate the
development of a
flexible workforce
(1,3,4,5,10,12)

• FLOW TIME Order to Delivery T
▲ STAKEHOLDER SATISFACTI
* RESOURCE UTILIZATION 0
■ QUALITY YIELD Scrap and Re

4]

MAKE
DECISIONS
AT LOWEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL

"Design the organizational
structure and management
systems to accelerate and
enhance decision making at
the point of knowledge,
application, and need."
METRICS
$ # of organizational
levels
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Establish multidisciplinary teams
organized around
processes and
products (1,4,5,9,12)
• Delegate or share
responsibility for
decisions throughout
the value chain
(2,4,5,6,8,12)
• Empower people to
make decisions at
the point of work
(2,3,4,5,6,8)
• Minimize hand-offs
and approvals within
and between line and
support activities
(1,2,3,4,5,6,9)
• Provide environment
and well-defined
processes for
expedited decisionmaking (2,4,5,11)

1] IMPLEMENT INTEGRATED
PRODUCT AND PROCESS
DEVELOPMENT
"Create products through an integrated team
effort of people and organizations which are
knowledgeable of and responsible for all phases
of the product's life cycle from concept
definition through development, production,
deployment, operations and support, and final
disposal."
METRICS
■ # of engineering changes (change traffic)
after initial design release
^ IPT continuity through development
cycle
# Total product development cycle time
from concept to launch
A Supplier involvement in IPTs
ENABLING PRACTICES
Design in capability
Use systems
for potential growth
engineering
& adaptability
approach in
(5,7,12)
product design and
development
Establish effective
(2,5,11,12)
IPTs (4,5,6)
Establish clear sets
Involve all
of requirements and
stakeholders early
allocate these to
in the requirements
affected elements
definition, design
of the product and
and development
processes
process
(1,2,5,6,7,12)
(2,4,5,6,7,12)
Definitize risk
Use the "Software
management
Factory" Process
(2,5,12)
(1,5,11)
Incorporate design
Implement design
for manufacturing,
to cost processes
test, maintenance
(2,5,7,9)
and disposal in all
Maintain continuity
engineering phases
of planning
(1,2,4,5,7,9,11)
throughout the
product
development
process (5,6,7,12)

BAvc
"Estab
rt

enter/:

A
*▲
▲
A

PRINCIPLES
Meta-Principles
Responsiveness to Change • Waste Minimization
Enterprise Principles
Right Thing at Right Place, Right Time, and in the Right Quantity
Effective Relationships within the Value Stream
Continuous Improvement
Optimal First Delivered Unit Quality

ENTERPRISE
.OW TIME

LEVEL

METRICS

Order to Delivery Time in Months • Product Development Cycle Time (Industry Comparative, % Reduction)

HAKEHOLDER SATISFACTION
ESOURCE UTILIZATION
JALITY YIELD

On Time Deliveries • Continuous Cost / Price Improvement

Output / Employee • Inventory Turns

Scrap and Rework Rate — Design Changes / Initial Release / Project Phase

OVERARCHING

PRACTICES

I
GRATED
30CESS
NT
ntegrated team
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ble for all phases
rom concept
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ipport, and final

1]

DEVELOP
RELATIONSHIPS
BASED ON MUTUAL TRUST
AND COMMITMENT

"Establish stable and on-going cooperative
relationships within the extended
enterprise, encompassing both customers
and suppliers."
METRICS
A

s (change traffic)
e
avelopment
>nt cycle time
PTs
ICES
sign in capability
potential growth
daptability
712)
ablish effective
s (4,5,6)
olve all
keholders early
he requirements
inition, design
I development
cess
,5,6,7,12)
j the "Software
:tory" Process
■11)

ilement design
:ost processes
■ .7,9)
mtain continuity
banning
lughout the
duct
elopment
cess (5,6,7,12)

A\
$ A

A
A

# of strategic alliances
total # of direct suppliers
# of projects w/customers on IPTs
% of procurement dollars purchased
under long-term supplier
agreements
# of years of relationship with
suppliers
Existence of formal communications
programs
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Build stable and
cooperative
relationships
internally and
externally
(2,5,4,6,7,12)
• Establish labormanagement
partnerships (3,6,8)
• Strive for continued
employment or
employability of the
workforce (3,6,9,10)
• Provide for mutual
sharing of benefits
from implementation
of lean practices
(5,6,9)
• Establish common
objectives among all
stakeholders
(6,7,9,10,12)

'S

If} CONTINUOUSLY
FOCUS ON
THE CUSTOMER

®PROMOTE L
LEADERS!
AT ALL LEV

"Proactively understand and
respond to the needs of the
internal and external
customers."

"Align and invoi
stakeholders to aci
enterprise's lean

METRICS

A Lean metrics
levels

% A Customer access to
supplier information
A % of projects w/
customers on IPTs
A On time delivery from
source to point of use
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Provide for
continuous
information flow and
feedback with
stakeholders
(2,4,5,7,9,11,12)
• Optimize the
contract process to
be flexible to learning
and changing
requirements
(6,7,9,10,11,12)
• Create and maintain
relationships with
customers in
requirements
generation, product
design, development
and solution-based
problem solving
(5,6,7,9)

METRICS

ENABLING PRAC
• Flow-down leai
principles, prac
and metrics to
organizational I
(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8.
11,12)
• Instill individua
ownership
throughout the
workforce in all
products and
services that at
provided
(1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,
• Assure consistc
of enterprise st
with lean princi
and practices
(4,6,8,12)
• Involve union
leadership in
promoting and
implementing li
practices
(1,3,4,5,6,8,9,1C
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D PROMOTE LEAN
LEADERSHIP
AT ALL LEVELS
"Align and involve all
stakeholders to achieve the
enterprise's lean vision."
METRICS
A Lean metrics at all
levels
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Flow-down lean
principles, practices
and metrics to all
organizational levels
(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,
11,12)
• Instill individual
ownership
throughout the
workforce in all
products and
services that are
provided
(1,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11)
• Assure consistency
of enterprise strategy
with lean principles
and practices
(4,6,8,12)
• Involve union
leadership in
promoting and
implementing lean
practices
(1,3,4,5,6,8,9,10,11)

] MAINTAIN CHALLENGE OF
EXISTING PROCESSES
"Ensure a culture and systems that use
quantitative measurement and analysis to
continuously improve processes."
METRICS
$ # of repeat problems
A Customer assistance to suppliers
ENABLING PRACTICES
Set jointly• Establish structured
established targets
processes for
for continuous
generating,
improvement at all
evaluating and
levels and in all
implementing
phases of the
improvements at all
product life cycle
levels
(1,4,6,7,8,9,11)
(1,2,3,4,5,9,11)
Incentivize
• Fix problems
initiatives for
systematically
beneficial,
using data and root
innovative
cause analysis
practices (1,6,9,11)
(3,9,11)
• Utilize cost
accounting/
management
systems to
establish the
discrete cost of
individual parts and
activities (1,2,9)

SI

NURTURE A
LEARNING
ENVIRONMEN

"Provide for the develop
and growth of botl
organizations' and indivi
support of attaining /<
enterprise goals."
METRICS
$ A\ Training hours /
employee
0 Use of "lessons
learned" system
A Provision of suppl
training programs
ENABLING PRACTIC
• Capture,
communicate and
apply experiencegenerated learning
(2,3,4,9,10)
• Perform
benchmarking
(9,10,11)
• Provide for
interchange of
knowledge from an
within the supplier
network (1,6,9,10,1

e LEM: An On-Line Tool
s presently available on-line for all LAI members and their authorized suppliers. For more information about on-line access,
it http://web.mit.edu/lean or contact your local LAI Point-of-Contact for more details.*
'A complete member listing with Points-of-Contact is also available on-line at http://web.mit.edu/lean

m

NURTURE A
LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT

"Provide for the development
and growth of both
organizations' and individuals'
support of attaining lean
enterprise goals."
METRICS
$ A Training hours /
employee
0 Use of "lessons
learned" system
A Provision of supplier
training programs
ENABLING PRACTICES
• Capture,
communicate and
apply experiencegenerated learning
(2,3,4,9,10)
• Perform
benchmarking
(9,10,11)
• Provide for
interchange of
knowledge from and
within the supplier
network (1,6,9,10,11)

ED

ENSURE
PROCESS
CAPABILITY AND
MATURATION

"Establish and maintain
processes capable of
consistently designing and
producing the key
characteristics of the product
or service."
METRICS

■ cpk

3fC ■ Scrap, rework & repair
as % of cost
■ Software productivity
$ # of suppliers certified

SI

MAXIMIZE
STABILITY IN A
CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT

"Establish strategies to
maintain program stability in a
changing customer driven
environment."
METRICS
AH Schedule changes
■ # of baseline changes /
year
A ■ # of program
restructures
$ Procurement quantity
changes

H Engineering changes
(change traffic)

■ Program administration
continuity

| Lean practices
adoption

ENABLING PRACTICES

ENABLING PRACTICES
• Define and control
processes
throughout the value
chain (1,2,3,4,5,9,11)
• Establish cost
beneficial variability
reduction practices
in all phases of
product life cycle
(9,11)
• Establish make/buy
as a strategic
decision (11,12)

• Level demand to
enable continuous
flow (1,6,9,12)
• Use multi-year
contracting wherever
possible (4,6,12)
• Minimize cycle-time
to limit susceptibility
to externally imposed
changes (1,9,12)
• Structure programs
to absorb changes
with minimal impact
(5,11,12)
• Establish incremental
product performance
objectives where
possible (5,9,12)
• Program high risk
developments off
critical paths and/or
provide alternatives
(1,5,12)
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Appendix C: Modern ELV Successes and Failures through Oct 1998 [1]
2
1

Titan 4

Success

22

Failure
Marginal

Program

Result

Flight No.

Tail/Serial No. Vehicle Type

Titan IVA 402
Titan IVA 405
Titan IVA 402
Titan IVA 403

success
success
success
marginal
success
success
failure
success
success

313
318
320
321
322
325
326

K-l
K-4
K-6
K-5

329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
343
344
345
348
349

K-10
K-7

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

K-9
K-14
K-23
K-19
K-21
K-15
K-16
K-22
K-2
K-13
K-24
A-18
B-33
A-17
B-25
A-20

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

2

Titan IVA 403
Titan IVA 404
Titan IVA 403
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 401

K-8
K-3
K-ll

Titan IVB 402
Titan IVA 403
Titan IVB 401
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVB 401
Titan IVA 401

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure

Delta II

Success

71

Failure

Program

Result

Flight No.

Tail/Serial No. Vehicle Type

Delta II 6925
Delta II 6925
Delta II6925
Delta II 6925
Delta II 6925
Delta II6925
Delta II6920-8
Delta II6925
Delta II6925-8
Delta II6920-10
Delta II 6925

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success

183
185
186
188
190
191
192
193
194
195
197

184
185
186
188
190
191
192
193
194
195
197

Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 402
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 404
Titan IVA 401
Titan IVA 403
Titan IVA 403
Titan IVA 404

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

A-4

Launch Date
6/14/89
6/8/90
11/12/90
3/8/91
11/8/91
11/28/92
8/2/93
2/7/94
5/3/94
8/27/94
12/22/94
5/14/95
7/10/95
11/6/95
12/5/95
4/24/96
5/12/96
7/3/96
12/20/96
2/23/97
10/24/97
10/15/97
11/8/97
5/9/98
8/12/98

Launch Date
2/14/89
6/10/89
8/18/89
10/21/89
12/11/89
1/24/90
2/14/90
3/26/90
4/13/90
6/1/90
8/2/90

Delta II6925-8
Delta II6925

success
success

198
199

198
199

launch vehicle
launch vehicle

8/18/90
10/1/90

Delta II6925

success
success

200

200
201

launch vehicle

10/30/90

launch vehicle
launch vehicle

11/26/90

Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II 6925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925-8
Delta II 6920-10

success

Delta II7925
Delta II 6925
Delta 117925
Delta II7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II 7925
Delta 11 7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925-8
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II 7920
Delta II7920-10
Delta II 7925
Delta II7925-8
Delta II 7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II7925
Delta II 7925
Delta II7920-10
Delta IIA 7925
Delta 11 7920-10

success

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
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1/8/91
3/8/91
4/13/91
5/29/91
7/4/91
2/23/92
4/10/92
5/14/92
6/7/92
7/7/92
7/24/92
8/31/92
9/9/92
10/12/92
11/22/92
12/18/92
2/3/93
3/30/93
5/13/93
6/26/93
8/30/93
10/26/93
12/8/93
2/19/94
3/10/94
11/1/94
8/5/95
11/4/95
12/30/95
1/14/96
2/17/96
2/24/96
3/28/96
4/24/96
5/24/96
7/16/96
9/12/96
11/7/96
12/4/96
1/17/97
5/5/97
5/20/97
7/9/97

Delta II7925
Delta II7920-10

success
success

245
246

245
246

launch vehicle
launch vehicle

7/23/97
8/21/97

Delta II7920-8
Delta II7920-10

success
success
success
success
success

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

Delta II7925
Delta II7420-10

success
success

247
248
249
250
251
252
253

8/25/97
9/27/97

Delta II7925-9
Delta II7920-10
Delta II7920-10

247
248
249
250
251
252
253

Delta II7920-10C
Delta II7920-10

254
255
256
257
258
260

254
255

Delta II7925
Delta II7920

success
success
success
success
success
success

256
257
258
260

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

Atlas II

Success

39

Failure

0

Program

Result

Flight No.

Tail/Serial No. Vehicle Type

Atlas II
Atlas II
Atlas IIA
Atlas II
Atlas II
Atlas II
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas II
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas II
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas II
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas II
Atlas IIA
Atlas IIA
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success

501
502
504
505
508
511
512

AC-102
AC-101
AC-105
AC-103
AC-104
AC-106
AC-108

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

12/7/91
2/11/92
6/10/92
7/2/92
7/19/93
11/28/93
12/16/93

515
517
518
520
521
522
524
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
535
536
537
538
539
540

AC-107
AC-111
AC-110
AC-113
AC-112
AC-115
AC-114
AC-116
AC-118
AC-117
AC-119
AC-121
AC-120
AC-126
AC-122
AC-125
AC-123

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

8/3/94
10/6/94
11/29/94
1/10/95
1/29/95
3/22/95
4/7/95
5/31/95
7/31/95
8/29/95
10/22/95
12/2/95
12/15/95
2/1/96
4/3/96
7/25/96
9/8/96

AC-124
AC-129
AC-127
AC-128

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

11/21/96
12/18/96
2/17/97
3/8/97

Delta II7420
Delta II7920-IOC

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

A-6

11/6/97
11/9/97
12/20/97
1/10/98
2/14/98
2/18/98
3/30/98
4/24/98
5/17/98
6/10/98
9/8/98

Launch Date

success
success

541
542

AC-133
AC-146

launch vehicle
launch vehicle

7/27/97
9/4/97

success
success

543
544

AC-135

launch vehicle

Atlas IIA

AC-131

10/5/97
10/24/97

Atlas HAS
Atlas IIA
Atlas HAS
Atlas HAS
Atlas II
Atlas IIA
Atlas HA

success
success
success
success
success
success
success

545
546
547
548
549
549
552

AC-149

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

Atlas HAS
Atlas HAS
Atlas HAS

AC-109
AC-151
AC-153
AC-132
AC-134
AC-130

12/8/97
1/29/98
2/28/98
6/18/98
3/16/98
10/9/98
10/20/98

Russian Proton D-l and D-l-e (Since Jan 1970) Successes: 211 Failures: 26
Program

Result

Proton K D-l-e CSL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-HSL-13)
Proton K D-l-e CSL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton KD-HSL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)

failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
failure
failure
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success

Flight
No.
21
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Tail/Serial
No.
x21
x23
x24
x25
x26
x27
x28
x29
x30
x31
x32
x33
x34
x35
x36
x37
x38
x39
x40
x41
x42
x43
x44
x45
x46
x47
x48
x49
x50
x51
x52
x53
x54
x55
x56
x57
x58
x59

A-7

Vehicle Type

Launch Date

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

1/30/70
9/12/70
10/20/70
11/10/70
11/24/70
12/2/70
2/26/71
4/19/71
5/10/71
5/19/71
5/28/71
9/2/71
9/28/71
2/14/72
7/29/72
1/8/73
4/3/73
5/11/73
7/21/73
7/25/73
8/5/73
8/9/73
3/26/74
5/29/74
6/24/74
7/29/74
10/28/74
12/26/74
6/8/75
6/14/75
10/8/75
10/16/75
12/22/75
6/22/76
8/9/76
9/11/76
10/26/76
12/15/76

Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-HSL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)

success
success
failure
success
success
failure
success
failure
success
failure
success
success
failure
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

x60
x61
x62
x63
x64
x65
x66
x67
x68
x69
x70
x71
x72
x73
x74
x75
x76
x77
x78
x79
x80
x81
x82
x83
x84
x85
x86
x87
x88
x89
x90
x91
x92
x93
x94
x95
x96
x97
x98
x99
xlOO
xlOl
xl02
xl03
xl04
xl05
xl06
xl07
xl08
xl09
xllO
xlll
xll2
xll3
xll4
xll5
xll6
xll7

A-8

7/17/77
7/23/77
8/4/77
9/20/77
9/29/77
10/14/77
3/30/78
5/27/78
7/18/78
8/17/78
9/9/78
9/14/78
10/17/78
12/19/78
2/21/79
4/25/79
5/22/79
7/5/79
10/3/79
12/28/79
2/20/80
6/15/80
7/14/80
10/5/80
12/26/80
3/18/81
4/25/81
6/26/81
7/30/81
10/9/81
10/30/81
11/4/81
2/5/82
3/15/82
4/19/82
5/17/82
7/23/82
9/16/82
10/12/82
10/20/82
11/26/82
12/24/82
3/2/83
3/12/83
3/23/83
4/8/83
6/2/83
6/7/83
6/30/83
8/10/83
8/25/83
9/29/83
11/30/83
12/29/83
2/15/84
3/2/84
3/16/84
3/29/84

Proton KD-l-e(SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-KSL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-KSL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
failure
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145F
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
153
154
155
156
157
158
159F
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

xll8
xll9
xl20
xl21
xl22
xl23
xl24
xl25
xl26
xl27
xl28
xl29
xl30
xl31
xl32
xl33
xl34
xl35
xl36
xl37
xl38
xl39
xl40
xl41
xl42
xl43
xl44
xl45F
xl45
xl46
xl47
xl48
xl49
xl50
xl51
xl53
xl54
xl55
xl56
xl57
xl58
xl59F
xl59
xl60
xl61
xl62
xl63
xl64
xl65
xl66
xl67
xl68
xl69
xl70
xl71
xl72
xl73
xl74

A-9

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

4/22/84
5/19/84
6/22/84
8/1/84
8/24/84
9/4/84
9/28/84
12/15/84
12/21/84
1/18/85
2/21/85
3/22/85
5/17/85
5/30/85
8/8/85
9/27/85
10/25/85
11/15/85
12/24/85
1/17/86
2/19/86
4/4/86
5/24/86
6/10/86
9/16/86
10/25/86
11/18/86
12/29/86
1/30/87
3/19/87
3/31/87
4/24/87
5/11/87
7/25/87
9/3/87
9/16/87
10/1/87
10/28/87
11/26/87
12/10/87
12/27/87
1/18/88
2/17/88
3/31/88
4/26/88
5/6/88
5/21/88
7/7/88
7/12/88
8/1/88
8/18/88
9/16/88
10/20/88
12/10/88
1/10/89
1/26/89
4/14/89
5/31/89

Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e(SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e(SL-12)
Proton KD-1-eCSL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l (SL-13)
Proton KD-l-e (SL-12)

success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188F
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231

xl75
xl76
xl77
xl78
xl79
xl80
xl81
xl82
xl83
xl84
xl85
xl86
xl87
xl88F
xl88
xl89
xl90
xl91
xl92
xl93
xl94
xl95
xl96
xl97
xl98
xl99
x200
x201
x202
x203
x204
x205
x206
x207
x208
x209
x210
x211
x212
x213
x214
x215
x216
x217
x218
x219
x220
x221
x222
x223
x224
x225
x226
x227
x228
x229
x230
x231

A-10

launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

6/21/89
7/5/89
9/28/89
11/26/89
12/1/89
12/15/89
12/27/89
2/15/90
5/19/90
5/31/90
6/20/90
7/18/90
8/9/90
8/29/90
11/3/90
11/23/90
12/8/90
12/20/90
12/27/90
2/14/91
2/28/91
3/31/91
4/4/91
7/1/91
9/13/91
10/23/91
11/22/91
12/19/91
1/29/92
4/2/92
7/14/92
7/30/92
9/10/92
10/30/92
11/27/92
12/17/92
2/17/93
3/25/93
5/27/93
9/30/93
10/28/93
11/18/93
1/20/94
2/5/94
2/18/94
4/11/94
5/20/94
7/6/94
8/11/94
9/21/94
10/13/94
10/31/94
11/20/94
12/16/94
12/28/94
3/7/95
5/20/95
7/24/95

Proton KD-l-e(SH2)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-l-e(SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
Proton K D-l-e (SL-12)
Proton KD-1 (SL-13)
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success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
success
failure
success
success
success
success

232
233
234
235
236
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238
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242
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250
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254
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F261
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x235
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x237
x238
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x243
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x245
x246
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x249
x250
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x252
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x256

launch vehicle
Launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle
launch vehicle

A-ll

8/30/95
10/11/95
11/17/95
12/14/95
1/25/96
2/19/96
4/8/96
4/23/96
5/25/96
9/6/96
9/26/96
11/16/96
5/24/97
6/6/97
6/18/97
8/14/97
8/28/97
9/14/97
11/11/97
12/2/97
12/24/97
4/7/98
4/29/98
5/7/98
8/30/98
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